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I INTRODU(MTON
"0 your heart must have been made of rock or steel,
You who can kill
With your own hand the fruit of your own womb, ,
Euripides, from the play Medea
She shared 350 square f 6et of iv-
ing space with a hus band and for-
children, living in a converted..
Greyhound bus bought from a trav-
cling minister.2 As a valedictorian
and college graduate, she once
worked as a registered nurse? Yet
after the birth of her first child, her
sole responsibilities were at home,
primarily taking care of her chi"-
dren and serving as their home-
school teacher after her husband Flgure I" Andrea I Ya es*
CNN com, Officer Says Yates Led Him to Her Dead Children, at ht";/1
www.cnnncom/2002[LAW/0271.8/Yates trial/index.htm (last. modified Mar, 11, 2.2), Pto-
tograph provided with permission from CNN.com.
I, 3 TE CumpiErT GvEEK TRAGEDIE S EUTvTDrs 102 (David Grene & Richmond
Lattimore eds., 1959)
2, See Margery Fagan, Yates Shatters Maternal Myth of Competence, BoSTON Jiri -
ALDP Sept, 11, 2001, at Niws4, availatle at 2001 WL 3810809, Lee Hancock, Documents
Reveal Yatcs' History of Mental Jtness, SA°irLE Timrs Sept, 3, 200I, at A2, available at
200I WL 3519756; Lee Hancock, Yates Long Had Visioins, of ioiene, DALLAS MORNING
Ne.WS, Sept, 2, 2001, at 1A, available at 2001 WL 26643421; Laura Parker, 'Psychotic,' but
Is Andrea Yates Legally Insacel, USA TODAY, Sept. 11, 2001, at Al available at 2001 WL
5471183; Jim Yardley, Medical Records Telt a Story qf Mother's Deep Depression, On
LANDO SENINE . Sept, 9, 2001, at A4, available at 2001 WL 9207781,
3. See Lee Hancock, Yates Believes 'Devil' Is in Her DALLAS MORNING News, June
30, 2001, at 1A, available at 2001 WL 24407027 Parker, supra note 2; Susan Schidehette
et al Nightmare, PuoL, July 9, 2001, at 50, 53, available at 2001 WL 7420382; 60 Minutes:
Why Did She Do It? (CBS televisio broadcast, Dec. 9, 2001) (transcript on fle with au-
thor); 7day: Interview with Dirk Johnson (NBC television broadcast, Jme 25 2001) (tran-
script on file with author), available at 2001 WL 23800822,
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decided that babysitters should not be hired for fear of outside
influences.
Despite all of the exhaustion, frustration, and pressures, she still man-
aged to be a loving mother by all accounts-walking to the park or book-
store with her children in tow, playing basketball, and making heart-
shaped coupon books cashable for hugs and games on Valentine's Day.5
In addition to her maternal responsibilities, she also took care of her fa-
ther who was suffering from Alzheimer's disease-changing his clothes,
feeding him, and bathing him on a daily basis.6
However, she began to slide slowly into depression.7 She had a long
family history of mental illness-in fact, practically every one in her fam-
ily has been diagnosed with some form of depression.' After the birth of
her fourth child, she tried to kill herself by overdosing on her father's
Alzheimer medication.' On another occasion, she tried to slit her throat
with a steak knife.10 The failure of both suicide attempts led to repeated
hospitalizations, in which doctors diagnosed her with severe postpartum
psychosis."
4. See Eagan, supra note 2; Hancock, supra note 3; Parker, supra note 2; Schindehette
et al., supra note 3, at 54; Today, supra note 3; see also Amanda Ripley, A Mother No
More, TemA, July 2, 2001, at 30, 30 (noting Andrea Yates struggled to home-school her
children), available at 2001 WL 22574530.
5. See Pam Easton, Woman Tells Police of Methodically Killing Children, AssoctArw
PR, ss NEwswmnEs, June 22,2001; Mike Glenn et al., Morn of5: "I Killed My Kids", Hous-
TON CHRON., June 21, 2001, at 1, available at 2001 WL 23609237; Ripley, supra note 4, at
30; Today, supra note 3.
6. See Eagan, supra note 2; Hancock, Yates Long Had tsions of Violence, supra note
2; Yardley, supra note 2; 60 Minutes, supra note 3; Today, supra note 3 (mentioning Andrea
Yates was responsible for her father's daily care for the last seven or eight years of his life).
7. See Hancock, Documents Reveal Yates' History of Mental Illness, supra note 2; Han-
cock, supra note 3; Schindehette et al., supra note 3, at 52; Yardley, supra note 2; 60 Min-
utes, supra note 3.
8. See Hancock, supra note 3; Hancock, Yates Long Had Visions of Violence, supra
note 2; Yardley, supra note 2.
9. See Eagan, supra note 2; Hancock, Documents Reveal Yates' History of Mental Ill-
ness, supra note 2; Hancock, supra note 3; Hancock, Yates Long Had Visions of Violence,
supra note 2; Parker, supra note 2; Ripley, supra note 4, at 30; Schindehette et al., supra
note 3, at 52-54; Lisa Teachey, Release of Yates' Records a Legal Maneuver, HousTo.
CHRON., Sept. 2,2001, at NEvs 37, available at 2001 WL 23625714; Yardley, supra note 2;
60 Minutes, supra note 3; Today, supra note 3.
10. See Eagan, supra note 2; Hancock, Docunents Reveal Yates' History of Mental
Illness, supra note 2; Hancock, supra note 3; Hancock, Yates Long Had Visions of Violence,
supra note 2; Parker, supra note 2; Ripley, supra note 4, at 30; Teachey, supra note 9;
Yardley, supra note 2; Today, supra note 3.
11. See Hancock, Documents Reveal Yates' History of Mental Illness, supra note 2;
Hancock, Yates Long Had Visions of Violence, supra note 2; Parker, supra note 2; Teachey,
supra note 9; Yardley, supra note 2; Today, supra note 3.
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Yates told her therapist about the voices she had been hearing, which
instructed her to get a knife and stab people around her; these voices
resulted in bloody, violent delusions.' 2 She explained that she tried to kill
herself because it would be better to end her own life than to endanger
the lives of others." Noting that her husband's determination to have a
big family was putting a severe strain on her,14 the doctors advised her
that having more children "will surely guarantee further psychotic
depression." 15
Nevertheless, she conceived and welcomed the birth of a fifth child.16
Four months after the birth, her father died,' 7 and she was suddenly
plunged into another bout of depression. 8 She required further hospital-
ization because she was completely mute and only sleeping one or two
hours a night.' 9 She became non-responsive to anti-depressants and
stopped eating, leading to the point when she could no longer breast-feed
her newborn.2 ° She was so severely depressed, paranoid, and psychotic
that the doctor initially sought to have her involuntarily committed but
discharged her a few weeks later.2'
12. See Eagan, supra note 2; Hancock, Documents Reveal Yates' History of Mental
Illness, supra note 2; Hancock, Yates Long Had Visions of Violence, supra note 2; Parker,
supra note 2; Teachey, supra note 9; Yardley, supra note 2; 60 Minutes, supra note 3.
13. See Hancock, Documents Reveal Yates' History of Mental Illness, supra note 2;
Hancock, Yates Long Had Visions of Violence, supra note 2; Parker, supra note 2; Teachey,
supra note 9; Yardley, supra note 2.
14. See Eagan, supra note 2; Hancock, supra note 3; Parker, supra note 2; Yardley,
supra note 2.
15. Hancock, supra note 3 (revealing Yates told psychiatrists about her fear of failure
toward raising her kids); Teachey, supra note 9; 60 Minutes, supra note 3.
16. See Hancock, Documents Reveal Yates' History of Mental Illness, supra note 2;
Hancock, Yates Long Had Visions of Violence, supra note 2; Parker, supra note 2 (recount-
ing how the Yates' told their doctors they wanted to have more children); Teachey, supra
note 9 (mentioning the Yates' wanted to have as many children as "nature would allow"),
17. See Eagan, supra note 2; Easton, supra note 5; Hancock, Documen!s Reveal Yates'
History of Mental Illness, supra note 2; Hancock, Yates Long Had Visions of Violence,
supra note 2; Parker, supra note 2; Schindehette et al., supra note 3, at 52; Teachey, supra
note 9.
18. See Easton, supra note 5; Hancock, Documents Reveal Yates' History of Mental
Illness, supra note 2; Hancock, Yates Long Had Visions of Violence, supra note 2; Ripley,
supra note 4, at 30; Schindehette et al., supra note 3, at 52; Teachey, supra note 9; Yardley,
supra note 2.
19. See Eagan, supra note 2; Easton, supra note 5; Hancock, Documents Reveal Yates'
History of Mental Illness, supra note 2; Hancock, Yates Long Had Visions of Violence,
supra note 2; Ripley, supra note 4, at 30; Teachey, supra note 9; Yardley, supra note 2.
20. See Hancock, Documents Reveal Yates' History of Mental Illness, supra note 2;
Hancock, supra note 3; Hancock, Yates Long Had Visions of Violence, supra note 2; Yar-
dley, supra note 2; 60 Minutes, supra note 3.
21. See Eagan, supra note 2; Hancock, Documents Reveal Yates' History of Mental
Illness, supra note 2; Hancock, Yates Long Had Visions of Violence, supra note 2; Parker,
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She was hospitalized again when she was found kneeling beside a bath-
tub filled with water for reasons she would not, or could not, explain?2
Four weeks later, her depression began to spiral into a deep psychosis?3
Overwhelmed, sad, and anxious, she became catatonic and non-commu-
nicative, internalizing her fears and angers.2 4
For months, she had thought she was a "bad mother"-surely the Devil
was inside her.25 She had recurrent obsessive thoughts about her children
and how they might turn out because of her failures.26 She believed her
children were "hopelessly damaged" because of her own incompetence-
permanently scarred and disabled.27
On June 20, 2001, she watched her husband leave for work2 An hour
later, she drowned her five children in the bathtub, one by one. 9 She
laid the bodies of her youngest children on her bed after each drowning,
covering their bodies with a sheet, and left her eldest child in the bath-
tub.30 Panicked, she called the police and then her husband, asking him
supra note 2; Teachey, supra note 9; 60 Minutes, supra note 3. The doctor initially sought
to obtain a forced medication order from the court, noting Yates faced continued deterio-
ration and possibly death; however, the doctor, just a few days later, requested a suspen-
sion of the commitment hearings. See Hancock, Yates Long Had Visions of Violence, supra
note 2.
22. See Eagan, supra note 2; Hancock, Documents Reveal Yates' History of Mental
Illness, supra note 2; Hancock, Yates Long Had Visions of Violence, supra note 2; Parker,
supra note 2; Schindehette et al., supra note 3, at 54 (noting that, despite Yates' repeated
hospitalizations, Child Protective Services claimed that her case was never assigned to a
case worker because the hospital failed to assess Yates as a danger to her children);
Teachey, supra note 9.
23. See Easton, supra note 5; Hancock, Documents Reveal Yates' History of Mental
Illness, supra note 2; Hancock, Yates Long Had Visions of Violence, supra note 2; Parker,
supra note 2; Schindehette et al., supra note 3, at 55.
24. See Eagan, supra note 2; Hancock, supra note 3; Hancock, Yates Long Had Visions
of Violence, supra note 2; Parker, supra note 2; Schindehette et al., supra note 3, at 55;
Teachey, supra note 9; 60 Minutes, supra note 3.
25. See Hancock, supra note 3; Hancock, Yates Long Had Vi2sions of Violence, supra
note 2; Patricia J. Williams, Beyond the Village Pale, NATION, July 16,2001, at 9, available
at 2001 WL 2132753; Today, supra note 3.
26. See Hancock, Yates Long Had Visions of Violence, supra note 2; Ripley, supra note
4, at 30; Wilams, supra note 25; Today, supra note 3.
27. See Eagan, supra note 2; Hancock, Documents Reveal Yates' History of Mental
Illness, supra note 2; Hancock, supra note 3; Ripley, supra note 4, at 30; 60 Minutes, supra
note 3; Today, supra note 3.
28. See Glenn et al., supra note 5; Ripley, supra note 4, at 30; 60 Minutes, supra note 3.
29. See Glenn et al., supra note 5; Parker, supra note 2; Ripley, supra note 4, at 30; 60
Minutes, supra note 3.
30. See Easton, supra note 5; Glenn et al., supra note 5; Ripley, supra note 4, at 30; 60
Minutes, supra note 3.
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to come home as she began to realize she had just killed her children.31
Finally, she had done what the voices had long told her to do.32 Such is
the story of Andrea Yates.33
This tragic incident inevitably calls to mind figures like Susan Smith,
the South Carolina mother who had so tearfully pled for the return of her
sons from "kidnappers" on national television, but who had, in actuality,
drowned her children by strapping them to their car seats and rolling her
Mazda into a lake.34 Similarly, more alarming headlines leap to mind: of
teenage mothers abandoning their babies in dumpsters, like Melissa
Drexler, a high school mother who gave birth during her prom in a toilet
and left the baby in a garbage can so she could return to her date.35 Sto-
ries such as these make us question the existence of maternal instincts
and the unconditional nurturing that society has so often associated with
the mother-child relationship.
Public reaction in the wake of these cases has plunged the nation into a
vortex of controversy, dividing the sexes along gender lines.36 Panic has
already driven four Houston mothers, fearing that they may face a similar
fate to that of Andrea Yates, to ask Child Protective Services to take
away their infants.3 7 Conversely, recent controversy surrounding the
Yates case may also cause new mothers to hesitate before asking for help,
lest they be accused of harboring homicidal thoughts toward their chil-
31. See Easton, supra note 5; Glenn et al., supra note 5; Ripley, supra note 4, at 30; 60
Minutes, supra note 3.
32. See Eagan, supra note 2; Easton, supra note 5; Ripley, supra note 4, at 30; 60
Minutes, supra note 3.
33. See Eagan, supra note 2; Easton, supra note 5; Glenn et al., supra note 5; Hancock,
Documents Reveal Yates' History of Mental Illness, supra note 2; Hancock, supra note 3;
Hancock, Yates Long Had Visions of Violence, supra note 2; Parker, supra note 2; Ripley,
supra note 4, at 30; Schindehette et al., supra note 3, at 50-55; Teachey, supra note 9;
Yardley, supra note 2; 60 Minutes, supra note 3; Today, supra note 3.
34. See Louise Branson, If You're a Woman and This Doesn't Melt Your Heart...
You're Not Alone, ScoTsMAN, Jan. 6, 2000, at 14, available at 2000 WL 7536036; Susan
Caba, She Loves Me, She Loves Me Not, AGE, Feb. 5,2000, available at 2000 WL 2313540;
Williams, supra note 25.
35. See Rekha Basu, Commentary, 77me to Tell These Mons Their Babies Can Be
Saved, S. FLA. SUN-SEwnNEL, Aug. 19, 2001, at 1B, available at 2001 WL 22750537; Bran-
son, supra note 34; Caba, supra note 34.
36. See Parker, supra note 2.
37. See Jan Jarboe Russel, Post-Partum Depression Doesn't Explain Andrea Yates,
SAN ANTONIO ExPREss-NEWS, July 1, 2001, at 1G, available at 2001 WL 22459249; Sally
Satel, The Newest Feminist Icon, WALL STREET J., Sept. 11, 2001, at A26, available at 2001
WL 2875243. In the aftermath of the Yates news story, the Houston Child Protective Ser-
vices received four telephone calls in a single day from mothers suffering from postpartum
depression who feared that they may follow Yates' example. See Russel, supra.
[Vol. 4:339
POSTPARTUM PSYCHOSIS
dren.38 A large number of women, especially those who are mothers
themselves, sympathize with the plight of Andrea Yates, 39 yet many men
see postpartum psychosis as a contemptible excuse ° Men tend to feel
this controversial defense is primarily used to escape criminal liability,'"
similar to theories of pubescent hormones42 and the testosterone43 de-
fense. Contrasting the media treatment of Andrea Yates with other ac-
cused killers like Nikolay Soltys,4 a Ukrainian immigrant charged with
38. See Bob Herbert, We Have Two Standards of Justice for Killers, SATrm POST-
INT-ELuGENcER, July 8, 2001, at D8, available at 2001 WL 3562566; Nancy A. Ruhling, Not
for Profit. Women Get Help for the Baby Blues, NEWSDAY, June 26,2000, available at 2000
WL 10021440; Satel, supra note 37; Sherry Thomas, Furor About Yates Rages On, Hous-
TON CHRON., Oct. 7, 2001, at LwasvTYl, available at 2001 WL 23634200.
39. See Herbert, supra note 38; Kathleen Parker, Men, Women Disagree About Mom
Charged in Killing 5 Kids, ORLANDo SmNTwnL, Aug. 19,2001, at G3, available at 2001 WL
9203871; Mark Steyn, Mons Defend a Baby-Killer, SPECTATOR, June 30,2001, at 18, avail-
able at 2001 WL 10480111; Thomas, supra note 38.
40. See Anne Koenig, PPD: From the Man's Perspective: Husbands Talk About the
Toll of Postpartum Depression, SUNDAY Nnws (Lancaster, Pa.), Aug. 12,2001, at G1, avail-
able at 2001 WL 9302243; Parker, supra note 39; D.L Stewart, Yates' Crime Proof of Ill-
ness, DAYTON DAILY NEWs, July 3, 2001, at 1C, available at 2001 WL 21267074; Steyn,
supra note 39.
41. See Koenig, supra note 40; Parker, supra note 39; Stewart, supra note 40, Steyn,
supra note 39.
42. See Phyllis T. Bookspan et al., On Mirrors and Gavels: A Chronicle of How Men-
opause Was Used as a Legal Defense Against Women, 32 IND. L Rnv. 1267, 1271 (1999)
(defining the menopause defense as a form of sexism and ageism because it characterizes a
middle-aged woman as inevitably becoming mentally or physically ill); Koenig, supra note
40; Stewart, supra note 40; Thomas, supra note 38.
43. See People v. Moore, 498 N.E.2d 701, 706 (I11. App. Ct. 1986) (noting the testos-
terone defense, which is only used in rape cases, is similar to an insanity defense because it
is based on uncontrollable urges caused by hormone imbalances); Koenig, supra note 40;
Parker, supra note 39; Thomas, supra note 38.
44. Nikolay Soltys, a 28-year-old former shoemaker and Ukranian immigrant, was
charged with a total of seven murders, including his: pregnant wife (adding the murder of
his unborn child), uncle, aunt, two cousins (both aged nine), and his 3-year-old son. See
Eric Bailey, Accused Mass Killer Found Dead in Cell Jail, L.A. Tihms, Feb. 14, 2002, at B1,
available at 2002 WL 2453954; Alexa Haussler, Authorities Say Sacramento Killer May Be
Psychotic, AssOCmATED PR.nss, Aug. 23, 2001; Parker, supra note 39; Suspect in Murder
Spree Kills Himself-Immigrant Was Being Held in Deaths of Wife, Son and 4 Others in
Family, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, NJ.), Feb. 14,2002, at 045, available at 2002 WL 1340704
[hereinafter Suspect in Murder Spree Kills Himsel]. Investigators theorized that Soltys
stabbed his pregnant wife first, drove twenty minutes to reach his uncle's house where he
killed four other relatives, then drove to his mother's home to pick up his son. See
Haussler, supra. He allegedly used toys to lure the boy into a cardboard packing box atop
a garbage pile before killing him. Id. All victims had their throats slashed. See Bailey,
supra; Haussler, supra. Suggesting that his relatives were killed for "poisoning" his reputa-
tion, Soltys told investigators that his wife had been disrespectful. See Bailey, supra. Notes
scrawled on the back of family photographs indicate he had planned an order by which the
murders should take place, and a numbered list referring to the slayings suggests each
2002]
THE SCHOLAR
killing his pregnant wife, son, and four other relatives, many point to
postpartum psychosis as a gender-specific defense offering female
criminals "special treatment" under the law.45 Yates is portrayed as a
hapless victim of circumstance by the National Organization for Women,
while Soltys is shown as a deranged, knife-wielding maniac.46 Neverthe-
less, their acts paint enigmatic pictures of the potentially monstrous na-
ture of the human psyche.
Yet cases such as those of Susan Smith, Melissa Drexler, and Andrea
Yates are neither rare aberrations of nature nor modern phenomena
unique to the United States; rather, they are contemporary examples of
the primeval practice of infanticide and neonaticides prevalent through-
out world cultures. Historically, millions of babies in Europe were aban-
doned at the steps of foundling homes,47 where they faced a meager
survival rate of only twenty percent.48 In China, female infants are com-
victim had been killed for "speaking out." See Bailey, supra; Haussler, supra. Bruises on
the body of Soltys' son indicate he had suffered physical abuse, and the family of Soltys'
wife had previously accused Soltys of regularly beating her, even on one occasion attacking
her with an ax. See Bailey, supra; Haussler, supra. Placed on the FBI's Ten Most Wanted
List, Soltys evaded police in a national manhunt for ten days and was regarded as a "cold-
blooded, calculated killer" so dangerous that anyone assisting him was "at risk of being his
next victim." See Haussler, supra; Suspect in Murder Spree Kills Himself, supra. After his
capture, Soltys committed suicide while in police custody by using makeshift rope from a
plastic bag and strips of cloth. See Bailey, supra; Suspect in Murder Spree Kills Himself,
supra. Though Soltys reportedly suffered some sort of mental illness and had a history of
depression, the circumstances surrounding the killings he committed were not the same as
that of Andrea Yates and cannot be compared as such. See Kathleen Parker, Flip-Flop
Logic a Red Herring to Justice, Agiz. DAILY STAR, Sept. 4, 2001, at B7, available at 2001
WL 10344669. Though both sexes should be treated equally under the law, women and
men "are not the same nor are their behaviors likely to be the same even under similar
circumstances." Id.
45. See Herbert, supra note 38; Martin Kasindorf, Calif. Suffers Bloody Summer, USA
TODAY, Sept. 11, 2001, at 3A, available at 2001 WL 5471169; No Excuse for Killing Chil-
dren, USA TODAY, June 27, 2001, at A14, available at 2001 WL 5465696; Thomas, supra
note 38.
46. See Herbert, supra note 38; Kasindorf, supra note 45; Don Lopez, NOW Shows It
Doesn't Want Equal Treatment for Women, DENVER POST, Sept. 12,2001, at B12, available
at 2001 WL 27665093; No Excuse for Killing Children, supra note 45.
47. See SARAH BLAFFER HRDY, MOTHER NATURE: A HIsTORY OF MOTHERS, IN-
FANTS, AND NATURAL SELECTION 299-300 (1999); Caba, supra note 34. Foundling homes
function similarly to orphanages that take in abandoned children, to "prevent the frequent
murders of poor, miserable infants at their birth" and "suppress the inhuman custom of
exposing new-born infants to perish in the streets." William L. Langer, Infanticide: A
Historical Survey, HIsT. CHILDHOOD Q., Winter 1973, at 353, 358.
48. See HRDY, supra note 47, at 301 (mentioning a mortality rate of eighty-one per-
cent at foundling homes due to inadequate care and neglect); Branson, supra note 34;
Caba, supra note 34. Foundling homes were well-known for their ignorant treatment and
intentional neglect of abandoned infants; the situation was so dire in "these horrible
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monly killed on the basis of their sex, an illegal practice that the Chinese
government is still trying to curb today.49 During the 1930s, almost every
mother in a Bolivian village killed her newborn "when prospects of rais-
ing a child with a suitable father were extremely poor."5 Though fathers
are purportedly more likely to kill their offspring, approximately 200 chil-
dren are killed by their mothers every year in the United States.5
Psychologists have termed acts of infanticide, characterized by the
mother blaming the Devil or claiming to have acted under the belief that
she was actually saving her children from woeful lives by sending them to
heaven, as "altruistic killings."52 However, is there evidence of mental
illness for such killings, or are these "killer moms" simply trying to get
away with murder? And what should be the law's response to such justi-
fications? This comment investigates the use of postpartum psychosis as
a legitimate means of negating the criminal responsibility component of a
charge of infanticide in Texas.
Part I examines the roots and myths surrounding infanticide from a
contemporary perspective. Tracing the slaughter of children throughout
history and literature, Part I reveals the functions and reasons behind the
ancient practice of infanticide.
Part II discusses the medical debate regarding the causes of postpartum
psychosis. Providing a medical definition of postpartum depression, Part
II briefly describes the three categories of postpartum disorders and their
effects on the mother. Characterizing postpartum psychosis as a disease
afflicting the mind, Part II also examines evidence of mental illness asso-
ciated with postpartum disorders, as well as the necessary steps toward
their detection and treatment.
Part 1I explores the special problems faced by a defendant using post-
partum psychosis as a defense. Chronicling the initial considerations of
the defense attorney and the special defense problems he must confront,
Part III evaluates the legal recognition of postpartum psychosis as a de-
fense in terms of both its usage and success rates. Analyzing postpartum
depression to determine whether it meets the legal test of insanity, Part
receptables" that they were associated with "legalized infanticide." Langer, supra note 47,
at 359.
49. See Chbiese Woman Drowns Granddaughter in Quest for Grandson, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESsE, Aug. 9,2001, available at 2001 WL 24987279; Evan Thomas, Motherhood
and Murder, NE\VSWEEK, July 2, 2001, at 20, 23, available at 2001 WL 19504939.
50. Caba, supra note 34; see HRDY, supra note 47, at 314; Branson, supra note 34.
51. See Schindehette et al., supra note 3, at 52; Thomas, supra note 49, at 22; see also
CHARLES PATRICK EWING, FATAL FAMILIES: TH DYNAMICS OF INTRAFAMILIAL HomI.
CdE 95-96 (1997).
52. See John Sullivan, Stressor Often Prompts Killings, Nrnws & OSEMRER (Raleigh,
N.C.), July 1, 2001, at Al, available at 2001 WL 3472005; Thomas, supra note 49, at 22.
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III compares the English common law to the American perspective of
infanticide. Part III examines the concept of diminished responsibility
and other factors of the insanity defense, particularly the effects of post-
partum psychosis on the defendant's competency to stand trial and the
requisite voluntariness requirement of criminal responsibility. Four tests
are examined in detail during this discussion of the insanity defense-the
M'Naghten test,53 the American Law Institute Model Penal Code test,5 4
the "Irresistible Impulse" test,55 and the Durham or "Product" test
5 6
Part IV looks to the effects of gender on criminal law, specifically from
the sentencing perspective. Discussing various theories of punishment,
Part IV compares sentencing for maternal as opposed to paternal infanti-
cides and examines how mothers are punished under the current Texas
justice system. In viewing postpartum psychosis as a gender-specific de-
fense, Part IV determines whether gender is a relevant factor in the
charge of murder. Part IV examines the validity of postpartum psychosis
as an "Excuse" defense,57 along with the partial defense of "Extreme
Mental and Emotional Disturbance."5 8 By presenting current case law
that raises postpartum psychosis as a defense, Part IV examines auto-
matic insanity presumptions as well as complete rejections of such a de-
fense. Evaluating current Congressional bills regarding postpartum
disorders, Part IV also addresses the Texas approach to postpartum psy-
53. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. Sco-rr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 310-20 (2d ed,
1986); Access Issues, 24 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILrTY L. REP. 706,714 (2000); Emily S.
Pollock, Note, Those Crazy Kids: Providing the Insanity Defense in Juvenile Courts, 85
MINN. L. REV. 2041, 2061 (2001).
54. See LAFAvE & ScoTr, JR., supra note 53, at 329-30; Michelle Migdall Gee, Anno-
tation, Modern Status of Test of Criminal Responsibility-State Cases, 9 A.L.R. 4th 526,536
(1981); Bageshree V. Ranade, Comment, Conceptual Ambiguities in the Insanity Defense:
State v. Wilson and the New "Wrongfidness" Standard, 30 CONN. L. REv. 1377, 1390
(1998).
55. See LAFAVE & Scorr, JR., supra note 53, at 310, 320-22; Maureen P. Coffey,
Note, The Genetic Defense: Excuse or Explanation?, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 353, 387
(1993); Laura Reider, Comment, Toward a New Test for the Insanity Defense: Incorporat-
ing the Discoveries of Neuroscience into Moral and Legal Theories, 46 UCLA L. REV. 289,
307 (1998).
56. See LAFAvE & ScoT, JR., supra note 53, at 323-29; Richard Lowell Nygaard, On
Responsibility: Or, the Insanity of Mental Defenses and Punishment, 41 VJLL. L. REv. 951,
967 (1996); Phillip E. Hassman, Annotation, Drug Addiction or Related Mental State as
Defense to Criminal Charge, 73 A.L.R. 3d 16, 64 (1976).
57. See Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law Care What the Layperson
Thinks Is Just?: Coercive Versus Normative Crime Control, 86 VA. L. REv. 1839, 1842
(2000); Choua Ly, Comment, The Conflict Between Law and Culture: Tile Case of the
Hmong in America, 2001 Wis. L. REv. 471, 488.
58. See 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 240 n.22 (1999); Case Law Development: Criminal




chosis, as related to mental illness through the Texas Mental Health
Code5 9 and the Texas Penal Code.
Part V advocates proposed approaches to the defense of postpartum
psychosis by either changing the burden of proof or considering such a
defense as a mitigating factor at sentencing, if not both; it advocates the
possibility of manslaughter for infanticide and involuntary manslaughter
for neonaticide. Lastly, the Texas Penal Code and proposed amendments
are analyzed and compared to the "guilty but mentally ill" standard' of
other states, as well as the Model Penal Code. Part V ultimately looks to
various statutes-state, federal, and foreign-for possible answers to the
puzzle of postpartum psychosis in Texas courts today.
II. RooTS AND MYTHS OF INFANTICIDE: A
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTVvE
"Powerless women have always used mothering as a channel-narrow
but deep-for their own human will to power. "61
Adrienne Rich, twentieth-century -writer
Psychological and sociological analysis can help us understand the fac-
tors that shape the way we regard and treat those who commit infanti-
cide, both in practice and in law. Stories throughout our history and
literature62 provide rich insights. Furthermore, examination of our his-
59. The Texas Mental Health Code is found within Subtitle C., Title 7 of the Mental
Health and Mental Retardation section of the Health and Safety Code. See Tax. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE ANN. § 571.001 (Vernon 2001). Section 571.001, Short Title, notes "this
subtitle may be cited as the Texas Mental Health Code." Id.
60. See Wtliam B. Bystrynski, Note, Riggins v. Nevada: Toward a Standard for Medi-
cating the Incompetent Defendant to Competence, 71 N.C. L REv. 1206, 1223 n.122 (1993);
Carol A. Gaudet, Note, Linking Genes with Behavior: The Social and Legal Implications
of Using Genetic Evidence in Criminal Trials, 24 FORDHAM URn. LJ. 597, 615 (1997).
61. PATRICIA PEARSON, WHEN SHE WAS BAD: How AND WHY WoMtEN GE" AWAY
wrrH MURDER 92 (1998).
62. Underlying incentives for infanticide are echoed in literature, which captures soci-
ety's reaction and treatment of mothers who murder their own children. In Greek and
Roman mythology, newborns left for exposure grew up to be heroes, such as Oedipus, Ion,
and the twin founders of Rome, Romulus and Remus, who extracted revenge upon their
parents for their abandonment. See AnBor ar AL., HISToRY OF ROMULUS 142 (1962);
ALBERT COOK, OEDIPus REx. MIRROR FOR GREEK DRAMA 35 (1965); 4 EURiPIDs 145
(Arthur S. Way trans., 1922); How Er At, A HIsToRY OF Ro.ME 21 (1915). Whereas the
Bible tells the story of Moses, fairy tales like Hansel and Gretel touch upon the social
problem of abandoned children at the time, particularly by the poor, and about wicked
stepmothers who plot sinister schemes against their step-children, as in Snow White and
Cinderella. See Exodus 1:22-2:4 (King James); 1 GRimM's HousEHO.D TALES 93-95, 208
(Margaret Hunt ed. & trans., 1884); TALES OF GRIMM AND ANDERSEN 114-15 (Frederick
Jacobi, Jr., ed., 1952).
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tory will enable us to comprehend the contrast between foreign laws and
the treatment of infanticide under American jurisprudence.
As the most prevalent violent crime committed by women, 63 the killing
of children occurred throughout history for various reasons: sacrifice,
birth control, eugenics, shame, or fear of punishment for adultery.64 In-
fanticide has been so universal that it "has been practiced on every conti-
nent and by people on every level of cultural complexity, from hunters
and gatherers to high civilizations, including our own ancestors. Rather
than being an exception, then, it has been the rule."'65 Since Upper Pale-
olithic times, tribal cultures have enforced social policies to destroy un-
healthy, handicapped infants and children born without parental
support.6 6 This practice was most widely exercised among nomadic peo-
ple to restrict population so as to meet nursing obligations and mobility
requirements of the group as a whole.6
7
In ancient Greece and Rome, exposure68 of newborns was permitted
and even enforced by law to dispose of the weak or the deformed, either
due to their imperfections or for fear that they would become burdens
upon the State.69 Even the prominent Greek philosopher Plato advo-
cated the extermination of infants "begotten by inferior parents[;]"7 like-
wise, Aristotle considered exposure to be the best method for curbing
overpopulation and controlling sex selection.7'
63. See LITA LINZER SCHWARTZ & NATALIE K. ISSER, ENDANGERED CHILDREN: NE.
ONATICIDE, INFANTICIDE, AND FILICIDE 2-3 (2000) (describing gender and child homicide);
L. Minturn & J.H. Davis, Infanticide as a Terminal Abortion Procedure, BEHAV. Sci. RES.,
Spring/Summer 1982, at 70, 75-83 (providing results of a study of infanticide).
64. See SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 63, at 2; Mary E. Lentz, A Postmortem of the
Post Partum Psychosis Defense, 18 CAP. U. L. REv. 525, 526 (1989); Susan C.M. Scrim-
shaw, Infanticide in Human Populations: Societal and Individual Concerns, in GLENN
HAUSFATER & SARAH BLAFFER HRDY, INFANTICIDE: COMPARATIVE AND EVOLrrIoN.
ARY PERSPECTIVES 439, 453 (1984).
65. Laila Williamson, Infanticide: An Anthropological Analysis, in INFANTICIDE AND
THE VALUE OF LIFE 61, 61 (Marvin Kohl ed., 1978); see Scrimshaw, supra note 64, at 439.
66. See A.M. CARR-SAUNDERS, THE POPULATION PROBLEM: A STUDY IN HUMAN
EVOLUTION 168, 216 (1922); SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 63, at 23.
67. See CARR-SAUNDERS, supra note 66, at 216; SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 63, at
23; Williamson, supra note 65, at 66.
68. Exposure can be defined as a form of deliberate infanticide by intentionally plac-
ing the child in a dangerous situation where he will most likely succumb either to harsh
climate or ravenous animals. See THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY 412 (8th ed. 1990);
Scrimshaw, supra note 64, at 453.
69. See SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 63, at 4; Lentz, supra note (4, at 526; Scrim-
shaw, supra note 64, at 439.
70. See SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 63, at 4; Langer, supra note 47, at 353-66.
71. See SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 63, at 4; Sarah B. Pomeroy, Infanticide in
Hellenistic Greece, in IMAGES OF WOMEN IN ANTIQUITY 207, 207-19 (A. Cameron & A.
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The Asian continent was also no exception to the widespread practice
of infanticide; this practice flourished in the South Sea Islands, Melanesia,
and Polynesia.72 Although prohibited by both Buddhism and Taoism,
most people did not think of infanticide as a serious wrong. In India,
wealth and high social status in the caste system was integral to the sur-
vival of the family unit.74 Since the great cost of dowries impeded the
accumulation of wealth, higher caste families often killed their female in-
fants.75 Comparatively, the Chinese saw sons as the only means of sup-
port for parents in their old age.76 Daughters were burdens unless they
can provide upward social mobility through marriage by allying their
families with those who were more powerful or wealthy.' Similarly, in-
fanticide was practiced in Japan to both reduce the size of families and to
increase their standard of living.7"
During the Middle Ages, Europe associated infanticide with other
crimes that challenged the established social order, such as parricide, her-
esy, witchcraft, and murder.79 Similarly, the Catholic Church condemned
infanticide and was more concerned that the practice was evidence of
Kuhrt eds., 1993)(observing social historians note more daughters than sons have been
selected for infanticide).
72. See MICHAEL TOoLEY, ABORTION AND INFANTICIDE 315 (1983); Williamson,
supra note 65, at 64. Infanticide is defined as the murder of a child at/or less than one year
old, while neonaticide refers to the killing of a newborn within hours of his birth. See
SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 63, at 1. According to Webster's New Work! Dictionary of
American English, "infanticide" is simply "the murder of a baby." W-nesTER's NEw
WORLD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH 691 (Victoria Neufeldt ed., 1988).
73. See Too.EY, supra note 72, at 316; Williamson, supra note 65, at 64 (describing
the cultural belief that a child is not fully human until accepted as a member of the social
group).
74. See CHERYL L. MEYER ET Al., MOTHERS WHO KILL THEIR CHILDREN 5 (2001)
(explaining the importance of the financial value of a dowry as a symbol of social status in
keeping the family from social ostracism).
75. See SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 63, at 26; Too.EY, supra note 72, at 316 (not-
ing infanticide as an accepted and common practice among various castes in Indian
society).
76. See MEYER ET A.., supra note 74, at 6 (explaining why sons are preferred over
daughters through the traditional Chinese societal structure).
77. See SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 63, at 26; see also Lentz, supra note 64, at 526
(noting that Chinese peasantry practiced infanticide also as a method by which to maintain
basic means of survival).
78. See SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 63, at 27; Lentz, supra note 64, at 526. In fact,
the Japanese term for infanticide, practiced for economic and demographic reasons, means
"weeding" or "thinning rice seedlings." See Williamson, supra note 65, at 64.
79. See LILLIAN CORTI, THm MvT OF MEDEA AND THE MURDER OF CHILDREN 24
(1998) (observing the prevailing theme of witchcraft in all versions of stories regarding
Medea, the first mother said to have committed infanticide); SCHWARTZ & IssER, supra
note 63, at 27 (explaining how infanticide was viewed during the Middle Ages).
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adultery or illegitimacy rather than the crime of murder.80 In large
households, the children's welfare rested primarily upon their parents,
who generally felt that killing a baby was no different from slaughtering
livestock for the sake of the family's survival as a whole.1
In the United States, poverty, rather than shame, was the impetus for
infanticide in the nineteenth century. 2 Like the parks and ditches of
London, dead infants were a common sight in cesspools and streets of
Philadelphia. 3 Throughout our history, economic necessity, poverty,
custom, and shame have been primary motivations for infanticide. One
must question whether modem-day teenagers and mothers alike will re-
sort to the established anthropological patterns of behavior when faced
with the birth of a child and when desperate at dire economic circum-
stances and the lack of social support thereof.
III. POSTPARTUM MOOD DISORDERS: THE MEDICAL DEBATE
"The ideal mother has no interests of her own. "84
Alice Balin, psychoanalyst, 1974
A. Diagnosis of Postpartum Mood Disorders
Widely recognized as a legitimate mental illness since first diagnosed
by Hippocrates in the fourth century, B.C.,85 the concept of postpartum
mood disorders is neither uncommon nor new. Approximately fifty to
80. See SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 63, at 27; Lentz, supra note 64, at 527 (describ-
ing infanticide as a crime particular to females from their "tendency for lechery, passion,
and lack of responsibility").
81. See SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 63, at 29; Williamson, supra note 65, at 63
(describing infanticide as a caring act to save the lives of older siblings who are already
established as members of the social group as opposed to an act carried out due to lack of
love for children).
82. See SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 63, at 31; Williamson, supra note 65, at 65-66
(observing that illegitimate children are usually looked down upon and treated as outcasts,
particularly in patrilineal social structures). The underlying motives of infanticide in the
United States were similar to that of Europe, though usually due to poverty rather than the
shame of illegitimacy. SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 63, at 31.
83. See SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 63, at 31; Scrimshaw, supra note 64, at 439;
Langer, supra note 47, at 361. The British press denounced frequent findings of infant
corpses in parks, ditches, cesspools, and under bridges as an "execrable system of whole-
sale murder" that was "positively becoming a national institution." Langer, supra note 47,
at 361.
84. PEARSON, supra note 61, at 92.
85. See ANN L. DuNNEWOLD, EVALUATION AND TREATMENT OF POSTPARTUM EMO-
TIONAL DISORDERS 1 (1997); EWING, supra note 51, at 62; Evelyn Attia et al., Postpartum
Psychosis, in POSTPARTUM MOOD DISORDERS 99,99 (Laura J. Miller ed., 1999). See gener-
ally ROBERT BINGHAM DOWNS, LANDMARKS IN SCIENCE: FROM HIPPOCRATES TO CAR.
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eighty percent of new mothers experience some degree of depression af-
ter giving birth.8 6 Out of that percentage, roughly one-sixth experience
serious depression, characterized by major mood swings, anorexia, insom-
nia, and suicidal ideations. 87
Only one or two mothers out of every one thousand actually experi-
ence postpartum psychosis during which they lose touch with realityY8
Reflecting the social construction of motherhood and its constraints, new
mothers are often reluctant to discuss or readily ignore symptoms of post-
partum disorders, because mothers suffering from the disorder tend to
feel guilty about having depressive or negative thoughts toward their chil-
dren and do not want to be characterized as "bad mothers;" this causes
them to eventually become isolated and non-communicative. s9 The
American Psychiatric Association has recently recognized postpartum
mood disorders in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disor-
ders, acknowledging the correlation between infanticide and symptoms of
mental illness as defined by postpartum onset within four weeks of
delivery:90
When delusions are present, they often concern the newborn infant
(e.g., the newborn is possessed by the devil, has special powers, or is
destined for a terrible fate). In both the psychotic and non-psychotic
presentations, there may be suicidal ideation, obsessional thoughts
regarding violence to the child, lack of concentration, and psychomo-
tor agitation .... Infanticide is most often associated with postpar-
tum psychotic episodes that are characterized by command
hallucinations to kill the infant or delusions that the infant is pos-
sessed, but it can occur in severe postpartum mood episodes without
such specific delusions or hallucinations.91
soN 21 (1982) (crediting the Greek Hippocrates as the renowned "Father of Modern
Medicine").
86. See EWING, supra note 51, at 61.
87. See id. at 61-62.
88. See DumaNwoLD, supra note 85, at 40; EWINa, supra note 51, at 62; Attia et al.,
supra note 85, at 101.
89. See AMEmcAN PsYcmATRIc ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MAN-
UAL OF MENTAL DisoRDERs 386 (4th ed. 1994); MEYER Er Al-, supra note 74, at 77-79
(illustrating a case study of a mother suffering in silence from postpartum depression be-
cause she is trying to cope with the guilt and shame that arises from her negative feelings
toward her newborn); Elizabeth I. Herz, Prediction, Recognition, and Prevention, in Posr-
PARTum PsycmAn-Ic IuEnss: A PicruRE Puzzit; 65,65-66 (James Alexander Hamilton
& Patricia Neel Harberger eds., 1992).
90. See AmERicAN PsYcHIATRIc ASsOCIATION, supra note 89, at 386; MEYER ET AL.,
supra note 74, at 11-12; see also EWING, supra note 51, at 62.
91. AEmRicAN Pscrnxruc AsSOCIATION, supra note 89, at 386.
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Yet despite its long "official" recognition, the nature of postpartum
mood disorders is still not well understood. "Postpartum Depression" re-
fers to several symptoms that a new mother may experience after giving
birth and encompasses multiple mental disorders broadly categorized by
the ambiguous and generic term of "postpartum depression onset."'
However, because postpartum symptoms do not differ from those in non-
postpartum mood episodes, mental health experts continue to debate
whether postpartum depression is in fact a separate and distinct diagnos-
tic entity.93 Nevertheless, postpartum mood disorders range in severity
from postpartum blues, to depression, and ultimately psychosis.94
Often known as the "Baby Blues," postpartum blues affects 85% of all
new mothers within the first two weeks after delivery.95 Characterized by
tearfulness, headaches, irritability, and appetite changes, the relatively
mild and transient symptoms of postpartum blues usually dissipate within
two weeks to three months after giving birth and rarely lead to infanti-
cide.96 In fact, postpartum blues is considered so common that it is
thought by many medical professionals to be a normal aspect of
motherhood.97
Problems arise when what appears to be a mild case of the "baby
blues" progresses into postpartum depression. Although, the symptoms
are deceptively similar-tearfulness, irritability, and loss in appetite-
postpartum depression causes the new mother to experience intense feel-
92. See id.; EWING, supra note 51, at 62.
93. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 89, at 386; Ewing, supra
note 51, at 62-63; MEYER Er AL., supra note 74, at 76; Laura J. Miller, Introduction, in
POSTPARTUM MOOD DISORDERS XV, xvi-xvii (Laura J. Miller ed., 1999) (discussing
whether postpartum depression is a distinct diagnosis, has a biological and/or symptom
pattern distinction, or differs from nonpostpartum depression only by timing); see also
DUNNEWOLD, supra note 85, at 2.
94. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 89, at 386; MEYER El' AL.,
supra note 74, at 76.
95. See MEYER r AL., supra note 74, at 77; Miller, supra note 93, at xvii; see also
DuNNEwoLD, supra note 85, at 28 (noting 80% of new mothers experience "Baby Blues"
after delivery).
96. See DUNNEWOLD, supra note 85, at 28; MEYER ET AL., supra note 74, at 77; Laura
J. Miller & Margaret Rukstalis, Beyond the "Blues": Hypotheses About Postpartum Reac-
tivity, in POSTPARTUM MOOD DISORDERs 3, 4 (Laura J. Miller ed., 1999) (describing self-
limiting characteristics in which symptoms dissipate without treatment after a short dura-
tion); Michael W. O'Hara, The Nature of Postpartum Depressive Disorders, in POSTPAR.
TuM DE RESSION AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT 3, 4 (Lynn Murray & Peter J. Cooper eds.,
1997).
97. See DUNNEWOLD, supra note 85, at 28; MEYER ET AL., supra note 714, at 77; Jan L.
Campbell, Maternity Blues: A Model for Biological Research, in POSTPARTUM PSYCtIAT-
RIC ILLNESS: A PICuPE PUZZLE 90, 90 (James Alexander Hamilton & Patricia Neel
Harberger eds., 1992); Miller & Rukstalis, supra note 96, at 3, 10.
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ings of inadequacy and anxiety related to her ability to care for her new-
born.98 As such, she sees herself as an incompetent failure with a
tremendous sense of fatigue and guilt about her inability to conform to
personal or societal expectations of a "good mother."99 This guilt com-
pounds her suicidal ideations and thoughts about harming her child."°
Affecting five to twenty percent of new mothers, postpartum depression
usually develops within the first six months after delivery and results in at
least some impairment of normal functioning. 1 Similar to depression
that may occur at other times in life, postpartum depression persists for a
minimum of several months and increases the new mother's vulnerability
to future depressions.10 2
Postpartum depression can progress from a slow and gradual onslaught
to rapid psychosis in which even the new mother may not notice the im-
pairment in her thinking during its insidious onset.'0 3 Often dismissed as
a case of "baby blues," postpartum psychosis is characterized by a severe
break with reality and a severely impaired ability to function due to hallu-
cinations or delusions, usually related to the newborn baby."° Hearing
auditory hallucinations in which voices urge them to kill their children,
new mothers typically exhibit strange behavioral tendencies in which they
isolate themselves from others, stop speaking, suffer severe sleep depriva-
98. See MEYER ET AL-, supra note 74, at 77; see also DuNmEwoLD, supra note 85, at
31; O'Hara, supra note 96, at 4-5.
99. See DuNNEWOLD, supra note 85, at 31 (observing women suffering from postpar-
tum depression tend to feel helpless and "fear that they do not have it in them to be good
mothers, or to ever care for their infants 'in the right way"'); MEY-R CT At., supra note 74,
at 77-79; Ricardo J. Fernandez, Recent Clinical Managetuent Erperience, in POSTPARTUM
PSYCHIATRIC ILLNESS: A Picrutu PuzzLE 78, 82 (James Alexander Hamilton & Patricia
Neel Harberger eds., 1992); Herz, supra note 89, at 65-66.
100. See DuNEmWoLD, supra note 85, at 31; MEYER rz At-, supra note 74, at 79; Fer-
nandez, supra note 99, at 82; Herz, supra note 89, at 65-66.
101. See DuNNEWOLD, supra note 85, at 30-31; EwiNa, supra note 51, at 62-63;
MEYER Er AL-, supra note 74, at 77 (stating that symptoms include tearfulness, irritability,
and intense feelings of inadequacy relating to the mother's ability to care for her child);
O'Hara, supra note 96, at 4-5.
102. See SciwAR-rz & IssER, supra note 63, at 105-06; O'Hara, supra note 96, at 12;
Barbara L. Parry, Postpartunt Depression in Relation to Other Reproductive Cycle Mood
Changes, in POSTPAR-uM MOOD DisoRDElRs 21,27-47 (Laura J. Miller ed., 1999).
103. See DUNNEWOLD, supra note 85, at 30; Herz, supra note 89, at 72 (explaining the
difference between postpartum psychosis and the blues as the symptoms of psychosis tend-
ing to worsen quickly with exacerbations of psychotic thinking and behavior through florid
agitation, hallucinations, and delusions weeks or months after delivery).
104. See DUNNEWOLD, supra note 85, at 41; MEYr-R ET At-, supra note 74, at 12, 77;
O'Hara, supra note 96, at 4; see also Herz, supra note 89, at 65 (recounting a new mother's
experience with postpartum depression).
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tion, and/or undergo extreme emotional volatility.10 5 However, these
symptoms disappear within several months of onset, even if untreated. 0 6
Additionally, there is a thirty to fifty percent risk that episodes of post-
partum psychosis will recur with each subsequent delivery-a risk partic-
ularly elevated for women with prior histories of postpartum mood
disorders. 0 7 Affecting one or two mothers out of one thousand births,
postpartum psychosis includes feelings of helplessness, obsessional think-
ing, infanticidal fantasies, and ultimately infanticide itself.'08 Mothers
may have delusions of guilt, fear about the infants' health, and regrets
about the possible harmful effects of their behavior on the infants
through distorted expectations, agitation, disorientation, confusion, sad-
ness, and anxiety. 109
A typical example of how postpartum psychosis leads to infanticide can
be illustrated in the case of Angela Thompson. Thompson gave birth to a
daughter and developed sleeping problems a few months later. 10 As she
came to believe that she no longer needed sleep, Thompson began to
experience hallucinations of a religious nature, particularly related to
105. See MEYER ET AL., supra note 74, at 12; SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 63, at
106; O'Hara, supra note 96, at 4 (describing the mother's catatonic state).
106. See MEYER ET AL., supra note 74, at 12; O'Hara, supra note 96, at 12.
107. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 89, at 386-87; DUN-
NEWOLD, supra note 85, at 41 (noting that mothers with a family or personal history of
bipolar illness are at such significantly greater risk that they must be monitored by a
mental health professional for development of postpartum psychosis both before and after
childbirth); EWING, supra note 51, at 62; SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 63, at 107; Meir
Steiner & William Y.K. Tam, Postpartum Depression in Relation to Other Psychiatric Dis-
orders, in POSTPARTUM MOOD DISORDERS 48 (Laura J. Miller ed., 1999).
108. See DUNNEWOLD, supra note 85, at 40; MEYER ET AL., supra note 74, at 12; Attia
et al., supra note 85, at 101.
109. See DUNNEWOLD, supra note 85, at 41; MEYER ET AL., supra note 74, at 12; Attia
et al., supra note 85, at 103; O'Hara, supra note 96, at 4.
110. See EWING, supra note 51, at 63-65; Anne Damante Brusca, Postpartum Psycho-
sis: A Way Out for Murderous Moms?, 18 HoFsTRA L. REv. 1133, 1164 (1990); Lori But-
ton, Postpartum Psychosis: The Birth of a New Defense?, 6 COOLEY L. REV. 323, 332-33
(1989); Tricia L. Schroeder, Postpartum Psychosis as a Defense for Murder, 21 W. ST. U. L.
REv. 267,282-83 (1993) (noting Thompson's psychotic delusions, hallucinations, and obses-
sions with the devil reappeared with deadly force when left untreated after her second
child Michael was born); Debora K. Dimino, Comment, Postpartum Depression: A De-
fense for Mothers Who Kill Their Infants, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 231, 251 (1990); Laura
E. Reece, Comment, Mothers Who Kill: Postpartum Disorders and Criminal Infanticide, 38
UCLA L. REv. 699, 750 (1991) (observing Thompson clearly suffered from postpartum
psychosis after the birth of her first child).
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darkness and evil."' As her psychosis grew, Thompson tried to throw
herself off a bridge and subsequently was hospitalized repeatedly.112
Upon her discharge, Thompson seemed to have resumed her normal
functions and appeared to have recovered completely,113 but the delu-
sions and hallucinations returned after the birth of her son two years
later. 4 Thompson again became psychotic and harbored a constant ob-
session with the Devil."' Preoccupied and completely self-absorbed, she
barely spoke and remained in a catatonic state." 6
One afternoon after her husband returned from work, Thompson
greeted her husband at the door and calmly told him that their newborn
son was dead. 7 The newborn's body was covered with a towel, and
Thompson readily admitted to having drowned the child in the bath-
tub."' She claimed she heard the voice of God saying that her son was
the Devil and, if she killed the child, her husband would raise him from
the dead three days later so the world would thereafter recognize her son
111. See EWING, supra note 51, at 63-65; Brusca, supra note 110, at 1164; Schroeder,
supra note 110, at 282-83; Reece, supra note 110, at 706 (explaining Thompson shouted
hymns and switched on lights in her attempts to drive out evil forces from her house);
Barbara E. Rosenberg, Comment, Postpartuim Psychosis as a Defense to Infant Murder, 5
TouRo L. REv. 287, 302-03 (1989) (observing some medical professionals still mistakenly
believe postpartum disorders to be merely psychological).
112. See EWING, supra note 51, at 63-65; Brusca, supra note 110, at 1164; Button,
supra note 110, at 332-33; Amy L. Nelson, Postpartum Psychosis: A New Defense?, 95
DicK. L. Rv. 625, 631 (1991); Schroeder, supra note 110, at 282-83; Dimino, supra note
110, at 251.
113. See EWING, supra note 51, at 63-65; Brusca, supra note 110, at 1164; Button,
supra note 110, at 333; Schroeder, supra note 110, at 282-83; Reece, supra note 110, at 706
(noting even Thompson's doctors saw "no reason why it [postpartum psychosis] should
happen again").
114. See EWING, supra note 51, at 63-65; Button, supra note 110, at 333; Schroeder,
supra note 110, at 282-83; Dimino, supra note 110, at 251; Reece, supra note 110, at 706.
115. See EWING, supra note 51, at 63-65; Schroeder, supra note 110, at 282-83; Reece,
supra note 110, at 706.
116. See EWING, supra note 51, at 63-65; Schroeder, supra note 110, at 282-83.
117. See EWING, supra note 51, at 63-65; Schroeder, supra note 110, at 282-83.
Thompson recounted the event:
I started becoming delusional after I stopped nursing Michael. I thought somehow
that he represented the Devil... The morning the baby died, I got a phone call from a
woman selling magazines. Right before she hung up, I thought she said, "All right,
Angela." I had been praying and asking God for guidance, and I thought that was
God telling me to drown the baby. I filled the tub, put the baby in the water and held
him down until he drowned ... He was an easy baby, a good baby, he was perfect.
Schroeder, supra note 110, at 282-83 (ellipses in original).
118. See EWING, supra note 51, at 63-65; Button, supra note 110, at 332; Nelson, supra
note 112, at 631; Schroeder, supra note 110, at 282-83; Dimino, supra note 110, at 251;
Reece, supra note 110, at 706.
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as Jesus Christ." 9 Obvious similarities are shared between this case and
that of Yates'. 2 °
B. Etiology of Postpartum Depression
Beginning early in her pregnancy, a woman experiences a myriad of
discomforts related to hormonal and physical changes in her body over
the course of the next forty weeks that result in her feeling that her body
is not her own.' 2 ' Levels of progesterone and estrogen rise dramatically,
growing twenty to thirty times the normal amount by the second trimes-
ter of her pregnancy.' 22  As prolactin and adrenal hormone levels in-
crease and the amount of circulating blood doubles, the woman
experiences extreme physical changes as her uterus, chest, and breasts
grow heavy."2 After birth, these changes reverse with dramatic speed.
Progesterone levels plummet to zero within a week, and estrogen declines
to 1/200th of what was maintained during the pregnancy.12 4 The new
mother is fatigued and perhaps feverish from the labor of childbirth and
may be in pain from continued contractions, perineal bruises, tears,
stitches, and hemorrhoids. 1" Her gastrointestinal tract is sluggish from
119. See EWING, supra note 51, at 63-65; Brusca, supra note 110, at 1164; Button,
supra note 110, at 332; Nelson, supra note 112, at 631 (recalling Thompson described
Michael's face as being contorted like the Devil's even after he was dead); Schroeder,
supra note 110, at 282-83; Dimino, supra note 110, at 251; Rosenberg, supra note 111, at
297. In Thompson's delusional state, the act of infanticide "must have seemed to be the
very essence of what was right." Nelson, supra note 112, at 638. Under such circum-
stances, how can knowledge of right from wrong under the M'Naghten test be more clearly
displaced?
120. Aside from the striking parallels between the facts of their cases, Thompson, like
Yates, also worked as a registered nurse. See Schroeder, supra note 110, at 282.
121. See DUNNEWOLD, supra note 85, at 9; Roberta J. Apfel & Maryellen H. Handel,
Couples Therapy for Postpartum Mood Disorders, in POSTPARTUM MOOD DIsORDERS 163,
164 (Laura J. Miller ed., 1999) (describing changes that occur during pregnancy).
122. See DUNNEWOLD, supra note 85, at 9; Victoria Hendrick & Lori L. Altshuler,
Biological Determinants of Postpartum Depression, in POSTPARTUM MOOD DISORDERS 65,
68 (Laura J. Miller ed., 1999) (noting that, while progesterone and estrogen levels peak
near term, they drop 200-fold immediately after delivery); O'Hara, supra note 96, at 14-16
(confirming levels of progesterone and estradiol dramatically drop by as much as ninety to
ninety-five percent after delivery). Progesterone and estrogen have been linked to mood
or psychobiological well-being while levels of serotonin have been correlated to violent
behavior. See Hendrick & Altshuler, supra, at 68.
123. See DUNNEWOLD, supra note 85, at 9; Hendrick & Altshuler, supra note 122, at
72 (discussing changes due to prolactin levels); O'Hara, supra note 96, at 16-17.
124. See DUNNEWOLD, supra note 85, at 9; Hendrick & Altshuler, supra note 122, at
67-68; O'Hara, supra note 96, at 15-16.
125. See DUNNEWOLD, supra note 85, at 9-10; Apfel & Handel, supra note 121, at 163-
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the effects of progesterone, making constipation likely. 26 The muscles of
her birth canal are soft and enlarged as to affect her control of urina-
tion.12 7 When her milk "comes in," the new mother's breasts become
firmer, larger, and increasingly tender, even painful at times.128
All of these changes to a mother's body often affect her self-image as
they continue well into the first postpartum year.129 Facing the chal-
lenges of the normal day-to-day tasks of motherhood, the mother may
develop expectations for her "performance," fearing that she may have
failed in some way.'30 Rather than seeing parenting as relatively tempo-
rary in nature, the new mother may feel powerless since she now must
neglect her own needs to the point of physical or emotional exhaustion
which contributes to postpartum psychiatric disorders.'
Several endocrine glands and their hormones play specific roles in the
development of postpartum illness. In a simplified picture, the high levels
of hormones during pregnancy appear to be maintained by the high levels
of placenta-produced hormones, particularly estrogen.' The fall of es-
trogen initiated by delivery sets into motion a chain of responses that
eventually diminish the production of hormones produced by the anterior
pituitary. 3 The pituitary gland is a small mass of tissue that lies directly
under the brain which secretes more than a dozen hormones that in turn
stimulate and control activities of several glands and processes through-
out the body. 4 The reduction of hormones secreted by the anterior pi-
126. See DuNNEWOLD, supra note 85, at 9.
127. See id.; Apfel & Handel, supra note 121, at 163-64.
128. See DuNNEWOLD, supra note 85, at 9.
129. See id.; see also Apfel & Handel, supra note 121, at 163-64.
130. See DUNNEWOLD, supra note 85, at 10-11; PAULA NicoLsom, POST-NATAL DE-
PRESSION 108-09 (1998).
131. See DuNEwomD, supra note 85, at 12; NicoLsoN, supra note 130, at 108-09.
132. See DUNNEwo.D, supra note 85, at 13-16; SCMARTz & Iss R, supra note 63, at
105; Robert B. Filer, Endocrinology of the Postpartum Period, in POSTPARTUM PSyctuAT-
ic Iwmss: A PicruRE PuzzLE 153,153-60 (James Alexander Hamilton & Patricia Neel
Harberger eds., 1992); Hendrick & Altshuler, supra note 122, at 66; O'Hara, supra note 96,
at 15-16.
133. See DuNNEwoLD, supra note 85, at 13-16; Hendrick & Altshuler, supra note 122,
at 75-76; O'Hara, supra note 96, at 14-15; see also SCHwARTZ & ISSER, supra note 63, at
105.
134. See DuNNEwoLD, supra note 85, at 13-16 (noting hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal
axis in endocrinalogical changes during pregnancy is implicated as one of the primary vari-
ants which causes postpartum mood disorders); J.C. Davis & M.T. Abou-Saleh, Psychiatric
Manifestations in Patients with Postpartum Hypopituitarism, in PoSTARTuM PsvcrAxrMUc
ILLNESS: A PicrURE PuZZLE 191, 196-99 (James Alexander Hamilton & Patricia Neel
Harberger eds., 1992) (observing the anterior pituitary secretes hormones, particularly the
adrenocorticotropic hormone (ACTH) and thyroid stimulating hormone, which control
lactation, the adrenal cortex, pigmentation of the skin, and the growth of bones and mus-
cles); Hendrick & Altshuler, supra note 122, at 75-76 (speculating oxytocin, a posterior
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tuitary consequently causes a decrease in cortisol and thyroxine, both of
which are essential to proper cell function. 135  Substantial evidence
reveals that relative deficits of these hormones lead to the symptoms of
postpartum mood disorders.136 Though certain studies have been incon-
clusive, experts have postulated that postpartum mood disorders arise
from a unique integration of hormone functions and interactions in the
placenta, pituitary, thyroid, and adrenal cortex.1 37
Other risk factors may also be significant causal elements of postpar-
tum mood disorders. A family history of depression and anxiety is an
inherited biological factor that is usually an efficient predictor of postpar-
tum depression and psychosis. 38 Similarly, psychosocial risk factors,
such as stressful life events, a strained marital relationship, and a lack of
social support, increase the woman's vulnerability to postpartum emo-
tional distress, particularly when coupled with an existing predisposition
to depression.' 39
pituitary hormone, is associated with coping, depression, and feelings of helplessness);
O'Hara, supra note 96, at 14-15; see also SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 63, at 105 (noting
postpartum psychiatric illness is "biopsychosocial" in nature, rooted in the biochemical,
psychological, emotional, and social changes a new mother experiences after childbirth).
135. See DUNNEWOLD, supra note 85, at 13-14 (asserting pregnancy shuts off essential
production of corticotropin-releasing hormone (CRH), prompting cortisol release, thus
leading to depressed postpartum mood); Davis & Abou-Saleh, supra note 134, at 198 (hy-
pothesizing that sudden and dramatic drops in hormones expose supersensitive postsynap-
tic receptors, which provide a trigger mechanism for postpartum psychiatric illness in
women predisposed to development of bipolar disorders); Hendrick & Altshuler, supra
note 122, at 69-71; O'Hara, supra note 96, at 14-15 (analogizing the hypothesis implicating
cortisol as the cause of postpartum psychiatric illness to the theory that cortisol is a factor
in premenstrual syndrome and menopause); see also SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 63, at
105.
136. See Davis & Abou-Saleh, supra note 134, at 198 (arguing that a rapid drop in
levels of cortisol and thyroxine during the postpartum period, coupled with transient hypo-
pituitarism, triggers postpartum psychosis as a corollary to the thesis behind the premen-
strual relapse of postpartum psychosis); Hendrick & Altshuler, supra note 122, at 66;
O'Hara, supra note 96, at 14-16; see also DUNNEWOLD, supra note 85, at 13; SCHWARTZ &
ISSER, supra note 63, at 105.
137. See DUNNEWOLD, supra note 85, at 16 (reporting postpartum psychosis is likely
to be biological in origin and can be effectively treated with thyroid hormone, a combina-
tion of thyroid hormone and antidepressant medication, or estrogen therapy); Campbell,
supra note 97, at 93-99; Hendrick & Altshuler, supra note 122, at 66; O'Hara, supra note
96, at 14-18; see also SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 63, at 105.
138. See DUNNEwOLD, supra note 85, at 17; Attia et al., supra note 85, at 108; O'Hara,
supra note 96, at 21.
139. See DUNNEWOLD, supra note 85, at 16-24; Attia et al., supra note 85, at 107-08
(asserting epidemiologic studies found the stated risk factors to be associated with the de-
velopment of postpartum psychiatric illness); O'Hara, supra note 96, at 19-20.
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C. Treatment of Postpartum Mood Disorders
Patients diagnosed with postpartum depression generally receive the
same treatment as other non-postpartum patients suffering from depres-
sion. This entails a variety of interpersonal psychotherapy, couples ther-
apy, pharmacotherapy, electroconvulsive therapy, self-help techniques,
and prevention through identification of risk factors and education.1 4
0
Ideally, new mothers should be screened for the presence of risk factors
during or before pregnancy through built-in checks that assess a woman's
mental health and potential effects of the pregnancy. 41 Treatment with
thyroid hormones, estrogen, progesterone, alone or in combination with
antidepressant medication, has been studied in an attempt to prevent the
recurrence of postpartum depression and psychosis. 1 42 However, effec-
tive treatment can only be ascertained when the true causes of postpar-
tum mood disorders have been discerned.
IV. THE "POSTPARTUM PSYCHOSIs" DEFENSE
"The power of the mother... is to give or withhold survival itself. ,143
Adrienne Rich, twentieth-century writer
A. Initial Considerations: Special Defense Problems
Unusual difficulties arise in the legal defense of infanticide. The juror
or fact-finder most likely has a bias or a particular predisposition regard-
ing motherhood, the nature of infanticide, and perhaps even the likely
fate of the perpetrator. 1" Mothers who have committed infanticide
while suffering from postpartum psychosis probably will have recovered
140. See DumNwoLD, supra note 85, at 50; Scott P. Stuart, Interpersonal Psychsother-
apy for Postpartum Depression, in POSTPARTUM MOOD DisoRDEaS 143, 144-46 (Laura J.
Miller ed., 1999) (detailing the effectiveness of pharmacotherapy and interpersonal psycho-
therapy in conjunction with counseling); see also O'Hara, supra note 96, at 23-25.
141. See DuNNEvOLD, supra note 85, at 79-81; Margaret G. Spinelli, Prevention of
Postpartum Mood Disorders, in POSTPARTUM MOOD DISORDERS 217,219 (Laura J. Miller
ed., 1999).
142. O'Hara, supra note 96, at 23-25 (detailing various studies and methods used to
treat postpartum depression); see DuNN WoLD, supra note 85, at 70-71 (addressing various
strategies used to address postpartum depression and psychosis).
143. PEARSON, supra note 61, at 64.
144. See MEYER Er Aj., supra note 74, at 172 (observing women who commit infanti-
cide receive wildly disparate sentences, depending on the predilections of local judges, ju-
ries, and prosecutors); Susan A. Hickman & Donald L LeVine, Postpartum Disorders and
the Law, in POSTPARTUM PSYCHIATRIC ILLNESS: A PicruR Puzzs 282, 283 (James Al-
exander Hamilton & Patricia Neel Harberger eds., 1992); Daniel Maier Katkin, Postpartum
Psychosis, Infanticide and Criminal Justice, in POSTPARTUM PsYCHIATRic IuLaESs. A Pic-
ruRn PuzzLE 275,275 (James Alexander Hamilton & Patricia Neel Harberger eds., 1992).
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when the insanity defense is used at the time of trial, even without the aid
of medication. 145 This ephemeral nature is particularly problematic in
that it contradicts the stereotypical notion of a severe mental illness as a
debilitating disorder that affects the defendant both during the commis-
sion of the act and at the time of trial, although this illness may be abated
presently with the aid of medication. Aside from the difficulties in
presenting the unique qualities of psychosis after childbirth-confusion
and the mercurial nature of the disorder itself-the defense must also
grapple with the fact that the terminology commonly used to designate
postpartum mood disorders does not convey the degree and quality nec-
essary to establish a credible position for the legal concept of insanity.
146
Infanticide is not an isolated crime or a freak occurrence committed
exclusively by women who are either insane or evil. The tasks performed
by one parent, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, throughout
the child's life are already difficult by themselves, but the situation is al-
most impossible for a mother incapacitated by a chronic mental impair-
ment like postpartum psychosis. Under those circumstances, infanticide
is not excusable, but also not far from unthinkable.
Mental illness or disability alone is not what leads to infanticide, but
rather a combination of the mother's vulnerable mental health status and
her social isolation. 47 In fact, against the backdrop of our stereotypical
construction of motherhood, this condition may be all but inevitable.
145. See MEYER ET AL., supra note 74, at 12; Hickman & LeVine, supra note 144, at
283; R. Kumar & Maureen Marks, Infanticide and the Law in England and Wales, in PosT.
PARTUM PSYCHIATRIC ILLNESS: A PICTURE PUZZLE 257, 257 (James Alexander Hamilton
& Patricia Neel Harberger eds., 1992).
146. See Robert Lloyd Goldstein, The Psychiatrist's Guide to Right and Wrong: Part
III: Postpartum Depression and the "Appreciation" of Wrongfulness, 17 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY L. 121, 125-27 (1989); Hickman & LeVine, supra note 144, at 283-94; Kumar
& Marks, supra note 145, at 257. The prosecution will most likely portray infanticide as an
example of extreme child abuse. In order to rebut that argument, the defense must have
ample positive evidence that the character and personality of the mother would make this
theory implausible by attaining evidence from those who know her to be a "good mother."
Hickman & LeVine, supra note 144, at 283-94; Kumar & Marks, supra note 145, at 257.
Often compared to the mental state of a sleepwalker, details or even major events that
occurred during psychosis are usually forgotten, and whatever is remembered is easily dis-
torted or added to by subsequent discussion or interrogation. See Hickman & LeVine,
supra note 144, at 283-94. The mercurial nature of postpartum psychosis is often apparent,
particularly in the aftermath of the child's death. The effect of the shock may be a change
in the pattern of psychotic thinking, coupled with terror, disorganization, and depression.
See Kumar & Marks, supra note 145, at 257.
147. See MEYER ET AL., supra note 74, at 12 (observing that women suffering from
postpartum psychiatric illness tend to stop speaking to others, isolate themselves, and be-
come emotionally labile and severely sleep-deprived); Goldstein, supra note 146, at 124-26.
[Vol. 4:339
POSTPARTUM PSYCHOSIS
B. The Insanity Defense
1. A Historical Perspective
As early as the sixth century, B.C., society has distinguished acts attrib-
uted to fault from those that occur without fault.14 Acts for which fault
could not be ascribed were thought to have been committed by children,
who, regardless of their intent, were incapable of weighing the moral im-
plications of personal behavior. 4 9 In this sense, mentally retarded and
insane persons were likened to children because they were unable to dif-
ferentiate between right and wrong so as to become invariably excepted
from criminal responsibility. 50 Though criminal law mandates that one
cannot be held criminally responsible unless each element of the offense
charged can be established, the insanity defense can be viewed as a device
that singles out an individual for commitment rather than an outright ac-
quittal. 5 ' Society has long recognized that insane persons are relieved of
criminal liability for their actions because they are incapable of under-
standing that their conduct violates a legal or moral standard. 52 The
only traditional difference between the treatment of sane and insane indi-
viduals has been the fact that insane persons have been locked away in
asylums rather than prisons.'5 3
148. See Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66,71 (Nev. 2001); Kimberly Waldron, Note, Postpar-
tum Psydosis as an Insanity Defense: Underneath a Controversial Defense Lies a Garden
Variety Insanity Defense Complicated by Unique Circumstances for Recognizing Culpability
in Causing, 21 RUTGERS LJ. 669, 683 (1990) (discussing societal views of the insanity plea);
see also RALPH SLOVENKO, PSYCHIATrRY AND CRIMINAL CuLpAnirrY 6-7 (1995) (discuss-
ing the origins of the insanity plea).
149. See Finger, 27 P.3d at 71; SLOVENKO, supra note 148, at 7 (observing Blackstone
wrote that "idiots and lunatics" are not chargeable for their own acts if they were incapaci-
tated at the time they acted); Megan C. Hogan, Note, Neonaticide and the Misuse of the
Insanity Defense, 6 WM. & MARY J. WoMEN & L. 259, 265 (1999) (noting that an individ-
ual must be able to distinguish right from wrong before he can be held accountable for his
criminal actions).
150. See Jonas R. Rappeport, The Insanity Plea Scapegoating the Mentally Ill-Mudh
Ado About Nothing?, 24 S. TEX. LJ. 687, 690 (1983); Hogan, supra note 149, at 265; Wal-
dron, supra note 148, at 683-84. See generally Joseph E. diGenova & Victoria Toensing.
The Federal hIsanity Defense: A Tnie for Change in the Post-Hinckley Era, 24 S. TEx. L.
721, 722 (1983) (describing the Hadfield case in which the insanity defense was first created
where the defendant's "delusional state" rather than his intent to commit the crime was
critical to a determination of his guilt).
151. See Finger, 27 P.3d at 71; Tom Whatley, Reshaping the Insanity Defense, House
Study Group: Special Legislative Report 13 (Texas House of Representatives 1984); 1
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. Sco-r, JR., SUBsT-rNVE CRIMINAL LAw 429 (1986).
152. See Finger, 27 P.3d at 71; Rappeport, supra note 150, at 690; Waldron, supra note
148, at 683-84 (asserting society willingly excuses the act due to the defendant's lack of
control and mental illness under the insanity defense).
153. See Finger, 27 P.3d at 71 (contending that although insane persons escaped crimi-
nal liability, they were still subject to confinement in an asylum rather than a prison); diGe-
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Premised on concepts of free will and personal responsibility, our legal
system recognizes that, when an individual is incapable of having the req-
uisite criminal intent or mens rea at the time the act was performed, a just
society cannot hold that person criminally liable. 4 Insanity is admissible
only as related to a material element of the criminal offense so that a
defendant is entitled to an acquittal only if the level of his mental illness
completely negates a necessary element of the charged offense.1 55 Thus,
most legal communities have generally accepted the concept of legal in-
sanity. However, the ultimate questions of what constitutes legal insanity
and how it should be presented to a jury under the American legal system
have yet to be resolved.
2. Theory and Application
In a majority of jurisdictions, including Texas, the M'Naghten rule 56
has long been accepted as the test to be applied when determining in-
sanity.'57 Under M'Naghten, the defendant is not criminally responsible
if he was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind
at the time of committing the act as not to know the nature and quality of
his act or, if he did know it, he did not know what he was doing was
wrong.' 58 The delusion must be so debilitating as to affect the defen-
nova & Toensing, supra note 150, at 722 (noting Hadfield, the first defendant to assert the
insanity defense, was imprisoned indefinitely in an asylum and died as a patient rather than
a prisoner); Reece, supra note 110, at 754; see also Michelle Oberman, Mothers Who Kill:
Coming to Terms with Modern American Infanticide, 32 AM. CRIM. L. Rtnv. 1, 8 (1996).
154. See Rappeport, supra note 150, at 690; Rosenberg, supra note .11, at 287.
155. See Finger, 27 P.3d at 75; Reece, supra note 110, at 717-18.
156. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN4. § 8.01 (Vernon 2001); Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 8
Eng. Rep. 718, 718 (1843); Maria Massucci & James A. Pitaro, Victimization as a Defense:
Valid Protection for the Innocent or Escape from Criminal Responsibility?, 8 ST. JOHN'S J,
LEGAL CoMMENT. 305, 327 (1992) (stating the M'Naghten test is the model most fre-
quently incorporated into state penal statutes). Section 8.01, Insanity, states:
(a) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution that, at the time of the conduct charged,
the actor, as a result of severe mental disease or defect, did not know that his
conduct was wrong.
(b) The term "mental disease or defect" does not include an abnormality manifested
only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.
TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01 (Vernon 2001).
157. See M'Naghten, 8 Eng. Rep. at 718; LAFAVE & Scorr, JR., supra note 151, at 436
(describing how the M'Naghten rule spearheaded the legal discourse regarding insanity);
diGenova & Toensing, supra note 150, at 723. M'Naghten was not deemed to be legally
insane under the M'Naghten test because, even if his delusion was true and the Prime
Minister was conspiring to kill him, he was still not entitled to take the law into his own
hands and hunt down the Prime Minister first. See LAFAvE & Scorr, JR., supra note 151,
at 436.
158. See LAFAVE & Scorr, JR., supra note 151, at 436; Marcia Baran, Comment, Post-
partum Psychosis: A Psychiatric Illness, a Legal Defense to Murder or Both?, 10 HAMLINe
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dant's ability to appreciate his surroundings by either robbing him of the
ability to understand what he is doing or depriving him of the ability to
appreciate that his action is wrong or unauthorized by law.159 Because
delusional beliefs can only be grounds for legal insanity when the facts of
the delusion, if true, would justify the commission of the criminal act, the
nature of the defendant's delusional state is pivotal to his ability to under-
stand right from wrong. 60
Some jurisdictions have created a presumption of sanity that can be
rebutted by the defense through introduction of evidence showing the
defendant to be legally insane during the commission of the charged of-
fense.' 6 ' Once such evidence has been presented, the presumption of
sanity is destroyed.162 The burden then shifts to the prosecution to prove
the defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt as a necessary element
of the crime charged. 63
As a product more of political necessity than judicial reason,1" the
M'Naghten rule has long been the subject of controversy. Though cre-
ated to provide a legal, as opposed to a medical, definition of insanity, the
I. PUB. L. & PoL'Y 121, 133-34 (1989). Two examples illustrate the two components of the
M'Naghten test. See LAFAVE & Scorr, JR., supra note 151, at 436. First, if A thought that
he was shooting at a target shaped like a human being, he would meet the first factor of the
M'Naghten test in that he does not comprehend the nature and quality of his act, specifi-
cally that he shot at a person instead of a target. See id. A would satisfy the second com-
ponent of the M'Naghten test, that is, the defendant's inability to perceive his action as
being wrong or illegal, if he thought he was a soldier in the middle of a battlefield and that
the people he was killing were enemies. See id. In this scenario, even though A knows that
he is killing human beings, he is unable to perceive it as wrong because of his delusional
belief that he is in the middle of a war. See id.
159. See Finger, 27 P.3d at 72; Christine A. Fazio & Jennifer L Comito, Note, Re-
thinking the Tough Sentencing of Teenage Neonaticide Offenders in the United States, 67
FORDHAM L. Rv. 3109, 3151 (1999); see also SLOVENKO, supra note 148, at 119 (noting
the hallucination or delusion must be relevant to the act committed, because an act by
itself is not considered pathological merely due to the presence of pathology).
160. See Finger, 27 P.3d at 85; SLovENKO, supra note 148, at 20-21; see also Beth E.
Bookwalter, Throwing the Bath Water Out with the Baby: Wrongful Exclusion of Expert
Testimony on Neonaticide Syndrome, 78 B.U. L Rv. 1185, 1197 (1998).
161. See Finger, 27 P.3d at 74; ROBERT F. ScH-oPP, JusTIFcArToN DEFNsES AND
JusT CONVICrIONs 24 (1998); Janet Ford, Note, Susan Smith and Other Homicidal
Mothers-In Search of the Punishment that Fits the Crime, 3 CARDozo WotEN's L.J. 521,
543-44 (1996).
162. See Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 473-74 (1895); People v. Skeoch, 96
N.E.2d 473, 475 (111. 1951); Finger, 27 P.3d at 74; SLOVENKO, supra note 148, at 34-35; see
also Scuopp, supra note 161, at 170-71.
163. See Davis, 160 U.S. at 473-74; Skeodz, 96 N.E.2d at 475; Finger, 27 P.3d at 74;
SLOVENKO, supra note 148, at 34-35; see also Scnopp, supra note 161, at 170-71.
164. See White v State, 456 P.2d 797,800-04 (Idaho 1969); Whatley, supra note 151, at
3; Rappeport, supra note 150, at 687-88. After M'Naghten was acquitted by reason of
insanity, Queen Victoria asked the House of Lords to devise a clearer, more restrictive
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M'Naghten test is based on what we now consider obsolete psychological
principles.'65 Moreover, the M'Naghten rule only considers the cognitive
aspects of personality by asking whether the defendant was able to recog-
nize the difference between right and wrong.'6 6 Excluding the volitional
aspect of behavior, particularly a defendant's capacity to make decisions
and to conform to those decisions in controlling his conduct,167 the
M'Naghten test fails to recognize scientific degrees of mental illness by
asking only if the defendant can distinguish between ethical concerns of
what is right and wrong. 6' Admittedly, the M'Naghten test asks only
whether the defendant had sufficient intellect at the time of the crime to
know what generally accepted standards of morality are, instead of mak-
ing value judgments on whether the defendant's behavior or theoretical
standards conform to those generally accepted standards;' 6" an individual
who can distinguish right from wrong but is incapable of controlling or
conforming his conduct to what is right due to an organic mental illness,
such as postpartum psychosis, fails to meet the requirements of legal in-
sanity under the M'Naghten test.'7°
Sometimes used in combination with the M'Naghten test, the "Irresisti-
ble Impulse" test' 7 ' considers a defendant who has a mental disease that
kept him from controlling his conduct as being legally insane, even if the
standard for establishing insanity, which resulted in the M'Naghten Rule. Whatley, supra
note 151, at 3.
165. See White, 456 P.2d at 801 (describing a predecessor of M'Naghten, the "Wild
Beast" test, which asks if the defendant had no more awareness of his actions than would a
wild beast); LAFAVE & ScoTT, JR., supra note 151, at 446.
166. See White, 456 P.2d at 801; Nelson, supra note 112, at 638; see also SLOVENKO,
supra note 148, at 19, 130.
167. See White, 456 P.2d at 801; ScHoPp, supra note 161, at 124; see also SLOVENKO,
supra note 148, at 19, 130; Victoria Nourse, The New Normativity: The Abuse Excuse and
the Resurgence of Judgment in the Criminal Law, 50 STAN. L. Rev. 1435, 1446-47 (1998)
(reviewing JAMES Q. WILSON, MORAL JUDGMENT- DOES THE ABUSE Excuse THREATEN
OUR LEGAL SYSTEM? (1997)) (extending the theme of self-control to claims based on
premenstrual syndrome, postpartum depression, and other versions of the insanity
defense).
168. See White, 456 P.2d at 801-02; SLOVENKO, supra note 148, at 19; JAMES Q. WIL.
SON, MORAL JUDGMENT 36-38 (1997); see also Nelson, supra note 112, at 637-39.
169. See LAFAVE & Scorr, JR., supra note 151, at 446; SLOVENKO, supra note 148, at
20-21; Bookwalter, supra note 160, at 1198.
170. See White, 456 P.2d at 801-04; WILSON, supra note 168, at 36-37 (stating the
M'Naghten rule does not take into consideration mental disturbances that are not delu-
sional but nevertheless affect people's abilities to control their actions); see also Bookwal-
ter, supra note 160, at 1198 (illustrating a case study where expert testimony was excluded,
even though it demonstrated the defendant lacked the capacity to appreciate and know the
consequences and nature of her conduct at the time of the criminal act).
171. See LAFAVE & ScoTT, JR., supra note 151, at 446; SLOVENKO, supra note 148, at
24-25 (noting an "irresistible impulse is an 'act [that] was not the act of a voluntary agent,
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defendant knew what he was doing and that it was wrong at the time of
the act.172 Under the "Irresistible Impulse" test, the defendant must suf-
fer from a mental condition which creates an overwhelming compulsion
urging him to commit illegal acts. 173 An example of the distinction be-
tween the two tests can be seen in the aforementioned case study of An-
gela Thompson. Thompson, who drowned her infant son because she
believed that God told her he would be resurrected as Jesus Christ, would
be considered legally insane under the "Irresistible Impulse" test but sane
under the M'Naghten test. 74 Under the "Irresistible Impulse" test,
Thompson knew that she was killing her son and that she could not law-
fully take his life; however, she could not resist what she perceived to be
the will of God and, as such, acted under the impulse of her delusion. 7
Founded upon the theory that insanity is established by a body of
symptoms, rather than one diagnostic symptom which varies on a case-
by-case basis,' 76 the Durham test"77 was based on the premise that an
individual was not responsible for an act that was the product of his
mental disease or defect. 178 In order to be considered legally insane
under the Durham or "Product" test, the defendant must not have com-
mitted a criminal act but for the existence of a mental disease or de-
fect.179 As the least restrictive test,"s the Durham test is criticized as too
but the involuntary act of the body, without the concurrence of a mind directing it'");
Nelson, supra note 112, at 639-40.
172. See LAFAvE & Scorr, JR., supra note 151, at 446; SLovENKo, supra note 148, at
24-25; Waldron, supra note 148, at 688.
173. See Finger v. State, 27 P3d 66,73 (Nev. 2001); SLtovnxKo, supra note 148, at 24-
25; Waldron, supra note 148, at 688 n.128.
174. See Finger, 27 P.3d at 73; SLOVENKO, supra note 148, at 24-25 (applying the "Irre-
sistible Impulse" test only to a sudden and transitory condition akin to momentary past
insanity); see also Nelson, supra note 112, at 639-40.
175. See Finger, 27 P.3d at 73; Christine Anne Gardner, Postpartum Depression De-
fense: Are Mothers Getting Away with Murder?, 24 NE-w ENO. L. r--v. 953, 973-76 (1990)
(arguing that any evidence showing a mother suffering from postpartum psychiatric illness
to know she was killing her child or to know it to be a criminal act would render her sane
under the M'Naghten test).
176. See LAFAvE & Scorr, JR., supra note 151, at 455; Nelson, supra note 112, at 640-
41 (recognizing the field of psychiatry considered the right-wrong test under M'Naghten as
an inadequate guide to mental responsibility due to its narrow focus on knowledge or rea-
son alone).
177. See Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 863 (DC. Cir. 1954); Finger, 27 P.3d
at 73; LAFAvE & ScoTr, JR., supra note 151, at 455.
178. See Durham, 214 F.2d at 876; Finger, 27 P.3d at 73; LAFAvE & Sco-r, JR., supra
note 151, at 455.
179. See Durham, 214 F.2d at 863; Finger, 27 P3d at 73; see also LAFAVE & Sco'rr,
JR., supra note 151, at 457. Postpartum psychosis is obviously a mental disease or defect,
marked by paranoia or delusion, under even the rudimentary definition of the Durham
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expansive and ambiguous, tending to cause the law to abdicate its policy
functions in deference to purely medical considerations.' 8'
Adopted in approximately half of the states and all federal circuits, the
American Law Institute (A.L.I.) Model Penal Code test' 82 integrated ele-
ments of M'Naghten, "Irresistible Impulse," and Durham into a two-part
test.18 3 In order to be held legally insane, the defendant must lack sub-
stantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law at the time of the conduct
as a result of mental disease or defect.184 However, an abnormality mani-
fested by repeated criminal or anti-social conduct does not constitute a
"mental disease or defect" under the A.L.I. Model Penal Code test.18 5 In
order to be considered legally insane, the defendant must have a substan-
tial impairment of his mental capacity, as opposed to merely possessing
some impairment as required by the Durham test or to the degree of total
incapacity as recognized by the M'Naghten rule.'86 Under the A.L.I.
Model Penal Code test, a defendant who appreciates the wrongfulness of
his act is still not criminally responsible if he cannot conform to the re-
quirements of law due to an incapacity caused by a mental disease or
defect, paralleling the "Irrational Impulse" test.187
test. Nelson, supra note 112, at 641 (noting the Durham test broadly defined "defect" as a
deteriorating condition incapable of improving).
180. See Finger, 27 P.3d at 74; Brenda Barton, When Murdering Hands Rock the Cra-
dle: An Overview of America's Incoherent Treatment of Infanticidal Mothers, 51 SMU L.
Rnv. 591, 598-99 (1998).
181. See White v State, 456 P.2d 797,803 (Idaho 1969); see also LAFAVE & Scor, JR.,
supra note 151, at 461.
182. See LAFAVE & Sco-r, JR., supra note 151, at 462-63; Barton, supra note 180, at
599 (noting that the test is codified in the Model Penal Code § 4.01).
183. See Finger, 27 P.3d at 74; Hogan, supra note 149, at 268-69.
184. See Finger, 27 P.3d at 73; LAFAVE & Scort, JR., supra note 151, at 462-63; Ho-
gan, supra note 149, at 268-69.
185. See Finger, 27 P.3d at 74; LAFAvE & Sco-r, JR., supra note 151, at 463.
186. See Finger, 27 P.3d at 74; Nelson, supra note 112, at 643 (noting only those actu-
ally suffering from postpartum psychiatric disorders will be acquitted under the AL.'s
test, and those acquitted will be institutionalized since automatic commitment to a mental
hospital is mandated by the Model Penal Code); see also Hogan, supra note 149, at 268-71
(discussing the M'Naghten and A.L.I. tests and their differences).
187. See White v State, 456 P.2d 797, 803 (Idaho 1969) (noting that the A.L.I. test
considers both volitional and cognitive impairments); Whatley, supra note 151, at 6; Nel-
son, supra note 112, at 643. Under the A.L.I. Model Penal Code test, a mother suffering
from postpartum psychiatric illness may successfully negate one of the necessary elements
by arguing that her psychosis rendered her incapable of appreciating the wrongfulness of
her act or prevented her from controlling her act. See Nelson, supra note 112, at 643.
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Viewed more in the context of strict liability, the Mens Rea Model"a
includes only the first part of the M'Naghten rule, eliminating the concept
of appreciation for the wrongfulness of an act.1 89 Defining criminal in-
tent simply as a decision to perform an act, the Mens Rea Model holds
defendants criminally responsible as long as they had the intent to com-
mit a particular act, even if the definition of the crime requires a more
specific mental state."9° As long as the defendant can appreciate the na-
ture and quality of his act, he is not legally insane and thus capable of
forming the requisite nzens rea.191 Altering the focus of criminal intent
without actually changing the elements of the crimes themselves, the
Mens Rea Model assumes that all crimes require the simple intent to do
an act and ignores the fact that most crimes have a required element be-
yond the mere performance of an act.192
Since even the most psychotic defendant may arguably know what he is
doing is wrong, the mere fact that postpartum psychosis satisfies the med-
ical definition of a mental illness does not exonerate a defendant suffer-
ing from such a condition under the legal standards of insanity. The test
of insanity turns instead on the interpretation of whether the defendant
understood the nature and quality of his actions during the commission of
the act.'93 A defendant suffering from postpartum psychosis may know
that killing her child was wrong but may not appreciate the wrongfulness
of such an act at the time, due to the debilitating effects of her mental
illness and the unique circumstances that may outweigh rational thinking
after childbirth.19 4 Under the M'Naghten test, postpartum psychosis sat-
isfies the criteria of a mental disease or defect by preventing the defen-
dant from understanding the nature and quality of her act or knowing
that her act was wrong. 9 The same defendant, according to the "Irresis-
188. See Finger, 27 P.3d at 74; Peter Arenella, The Diminished Capacity and Dimin-
ished Responsibility Defenses: Two Children of a Doomed Marriage, 77 COLUM. L REv.
827, 828-29 (1977).
189. See Finger, 27 P.3d at 75; Arenella, supra note 188, at 828-29.
190. See Finger, 27 P.3d at 75 (noting that an additional specific mental state, such as
malice, required by statutory definitions of the crimes charged may be overlooked).
191. See id.; see also Arenella, supra note 188, at 828-29.
192. See Finger, 27 P.3d at 75; Arenella, supra note 188, at 828-29.
193. See MEYER ET AL., supra note 74, at 71; Baran, supra note 158, at 133-34.
194. See ScuWAwrz & ISSER, supra note 63, at 108-09; Brusca, supra note 110, at
1150-51.
195. See Brusca, supra note 110, at 1152-53; Button, supra note 110, at 337-38 (noting
some experts assert postpartum psychosis meets the criteria of the M'Naghten test); Lentz,
supra note 64, at 540 (noting that, as a medically defined psychosis, postpartum psychosis is
a disease or defect of the mind and its manifestations can be analogized to other psychotic
disorders that are widely accepted as insanity defenses such as schizophrenia); see also
Michael J. Davidson, Feminine Hormonal Defenses: Premenstrual Syndrome and Postpar-
tum Psychosis, 2000 ARMy LAW. 5, 14 n.125 (2000).
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tible Impulse" test, is acting at the direction of her delusions rather than
her free will when her child was killed. 196 Alternatively, the defendant's
conduct may be a "product" of her mental disease or defect under the
Durham test, since having the child is at least the partial cause of postpar-
tum psychosis. 197 Since the Model Penal Code does not define "mental
disease," medical evidence can be fully disclosed to the jury to determine
whether the defendant experienced sufficient cognitive dysfunction which
caused her to lack substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of her
conduct or to conform her conduct to legal requirements under the A.L.I.
Model Penal Code test.198
3. Texas Law and the Impetus for Change
The insanity defense is seldomly used and even less often successful in
Texas. 199 In fact, defendants who employ the insanity defense tend to
spend more time in mental hospitals than they would spend in prison had
they relied on another defense.20 Though Texas traditionally used the
A.L.I. Model Penal Code test with some modifications,20 ' the Texas legis-
lature enacted a more restrictive definition of insanity in 1983, eliminat-
ing the uncontrollable-conduct test to return to the M'Naghten test and
restricting use of the insanity defense only to cases of severe mental ill-
ness.2"2 Requiring continuing criminal court jurisdiction over defendants
acquitted of violent crimes by reason of insanity as a form of post-acquit-
tal supervision, Texas formed a two-track system of jurisdiction, dividing
defendants accused of violent crimes and defendants of non-violent
196. See Button, supra note 110, at 338; Lentz, supra note 64, at 540; see also Deborah
W. Denno, Gender, Crime, and the Criminal Law Defenses, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
80, 122 n.193 (1994).
197. See SLOVENKO, supra note 148, at 24-25; Brusca, supra note 110, at 1153-54; But-
ton, supra note 110, at 338; Lentz, supra note 64, at 541; see also Deborah W. Denno,
Human Biology and Criminal Responsibility: Free Will or Free Ride?, 137 U. PA. L. Rsv.
121-23, 615 (1988).
198. See Brusca, supra note 110, at 1154-55; Button, supra note 110, at 338-39; John
Dent, Postpartum Psychosis and the Insanity Defense, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 355, 363
(1989); Lentz, supra note 64, at 541.
199. See Whatley, supra note 151, at 10-11; diGenova & Toensing, supra note 150, at
721.
200. See Whatley, supra note 151, at 11; MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN
PR.JUDICE: MENTAL DISABILrry ON TRIAL 229 (2000); see also Rachel Anne Dwarcs,
Note, Due Process Concerns with Delayed Psychiatric Evaluations and the Insanity De-
fense: Time Is of the Essence, 64 B.U. L. REv. 861, 865 (1984).
201. See Whatley, supra note 151, at 5 (noting the Texas legislature modified '!right
from wrong" provisions to correspond with the stricter requirements of the M'Naghten
Rule and placed the burden of proving insanity on defendants).
202. See id. at 12.
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crimes.2 "3 As part of the criminal courts' continuing jurisdiction over de-
fendants acquitted by reason of insanity for violent crimes, defendants
who are involuntarily committed can be discharged after a hearing in the
court that ordered the commitment? °4 This jurisdiction continues until
the defendant has been institutionalized for a period equivalent to the
maximum prison sentence of the crime charged.20
203. See id. at 13-17 (explaining that disparate treatment of defendants acquitted by
reason of insanity are justified because the defendants acquitted of violent crimes, though
found not guilty by jurors, essentially committed what would otherwise be criminal acts);
Ray Farabee & James L. Spearly, The New Insanity Law in Texas: Reliable Testimony and
Judicial Review of Release, 24 S. TEx. L.J. 671, 681-84 (1983).
204. See Whatley, supra note 151, at 14. Defendants acquitted of violent crimes on
grounds of insanity are automatically committed to a maximum-security unit for 60 days to
examine their mental condition post-acquittal. See TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
46.03(4)(b) (Vernon 2001); Whatley, supra note 151, at 13; Farabee & Spearly, supra note
203, at 681. Within thirty days of acquittal, the criminal trial court must hold a hearing to
determine whether the defendant should be involuntarily committed to a state hospital or
mental institute for a period not to exceed ninety days according to the Texas Mental
Health Code and Texas Criminal Procedure. See Tax. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
46.03(4)(d)(2) (Vernon 2001). Similar to the standards employed in a civil commitment
hearing, the State bears the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant meets the criteria for involuntary commitment or should be committed longer.
See id.; Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); Whatley, supra note 151, at 17; diGenova
& Toensing, supra note 150, at 731; Farabee & Spearly, supra note 203, at 681; Rappeport,
supra note 150, at 693.
205. See Whatley, supra note 151, at 14 (noting that any further confinement must be
by civil commitment after the continuing criminal court jurisdiction has expired). How-
ever, other states go even further in their disparate treatment of defendants acquitted on
grounds of insanity. For example, in other states, evidence of insanity "at the time of a
crime justifies a presumption that the defendant is not only still mentally ill but also dan-
gerous regardless of whether violence was involved in the commission of the crime." Id. at
16. Thus, defendants acquitted on insanity grounds may be required to prove their current
sanity by clear and convincing evidence in order to win release from indefinite commit-
ment. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 366-68 (1983); Whatley, supra note 151, at 17.
Even though Due Process requires that the nature and duration of confinement bear some
reasonable relationship to the purpose for which the defendant is committed, indefinite
commitment based on an insanity acquittal alone is still possible. See Jones, 463 U.S. at
368. Because correlation between the severity of the offense and the length of time neces-
sary for the acquittee's recovery is not required, the duration of the acquittee's theoretical
criminal sentence is thus irrelevant for purposes of his commitment. See Whatley, supra




Texas Penal Code section 8.01 states that insanity20 6 is an affirmative
defense20 7 when the actor did not know his conduct was wrong during the
commission of the charged offense due to a severe mental disease or de-
fect.2 8 The insanity defense is the only occasion whereby the defense
must furnish a reason or motive for a criminal act even though the reason
206. The concept of insanity is not to be confused with competency to stand trial,
Competency refers to the defendant having the ability to consult with hi; attorney with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding and having a rational and factual understand-
ing of the proceedings against him. See GERALD S. REAMEY, CRIMINAL OFFENSES AND
DEFENSES IN TEXAs 243 (2000). A defendant can be incompetent to stand trial but ad-
judged legally sane at the time of the crime or vice versa. Id.
207. See id. at 128 (noting that a defendant must persuade the fact-finder that he is
entitled to the affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence). Under In re Win-
ship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), the State must prove the defendant's guilt and every element
essential to the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. REAMEY, supra note 206, at
243. After Mullaney, it was suggested that affirmative defenses like duress and insanity
improperly shifted the burden of persuasion on the defendant to disprove the existence of
an essential element of the offense. Id. Patterson denoted that the State may shift the
burden of persuasion with respect to certain defensive matters as long as the effect is not to
ease the State's burden of proof on what is defined as an element of the crime in the
specific statute. Id. at 129.
208. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.01 (Vernon 2001) (denoting that criminal re-
sponsibility generally requires a voluntary act or omission); TEx. PENAL CoD ANN. § 6.02
(Vernon 2001); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03 (Vernon 2001); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 8.01 (Vernon 2001) (excepting that mental disease or defect does not include an abnor-
mality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct); see also
REAMEY, supra note 206, at 118. Unless the offense is specifically designated as a strict
liability crime, every offense requires at least one of four levels of culpability established
by the Texas Penal Code. REAMEY, supra note 206, at 118. These four levels of culpability,
intentional, knowing, reckless, and criminally negligent, from highest to lowest order, are
each divided into the nature and result of an actor's conduct. Id. at 119. Often inferred
from circumstantial evidence, an intentional act is the product of a conscious desire or
objective to either engage in the conduct or cause the result. Id. A knowing act is one
where the actor is aware of the nature of the conduct, existence of certain circumstances, or
reasonable certainty by which his actions are to cause a result. Id. at 120. In contrast, an
actor is reckless if he ignored a substantial and unjustifiable risk that he subjectively knew
to have existed. Id. Similarly, even though an actor may have been unaware of a substan-
tial and unjustifiable risk, he is still criminally negligent if he should have objectively
known of that risk. Id. Section 6.01, Requirement of Voluntary Act or Omission, states:
(a) A person commits an offense only if he voluntarily engages in conduct, including
an act, an omission, or possession.
(b) Possession is a voluntary act if the possessor knowingly obtains or receives the
thing possessed or is aware of his control of the thing for a sufficient time to
permit him to terminate his control.
(c) A person who omits to perform an act does not commit an offense unless a law as
defined by Section 1.07 provides that the omission is an offense or otherwise pro-
vides that he has a duty to perform the act.




itself does not necessarily provide a defense against criminal responsibil-
ity for the medically insane.20 9 The defendant must raise a reasonable
(a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), a person does not commit an offense unless
he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence engages in con-
duct as the definition of the offense requires.
(b) If the definition of an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state, a culpa-
ble mental state is nevertheless required unless the definition plainly dispenses
with any mental element.
(c) If the definition of an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state, but one
is nevertheless required under Subsection (b), intent, knowledge, or recklessness
suffices to establish criminal responsibility.






(e) Proof of a higher degree of culpability than that charged constitutes proof of the
culpability charged.
TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.02 (Vernon 2001). Section 6.03, Definition of Culpable
Mental States, observes:
(a) A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his con-
duct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to
engage in the conduct or cause the result.
(b) A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the nature of his
conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the na-
ture of his conduct or that the circumstances exist. A person acts knowingly, or
with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
(c) A person acts recklessly, or is reckless, with respect to circumstances surrounding
his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disre-
gards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result
will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard consti-
tutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would
exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
(d) A person acts with criminal negligence, or is criminally negligent, with respect to
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he ought
to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or
the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure
to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordi-
nary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's
standpoint.
TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03 (Vernon 2001).
209. See REAmEY, supra note 206, at 244 (recognizing that insanity is not established
as a matter of law even if the only witness expressing an opinion on the defendant's sanity
is an expert who concludes that he was insane because the fact-finder can choose not to
believe expert witnesses); diGenova & Toensing, supra note 150, at 731 (noting that motive
is not a relevant defense consideration in all other circumstances, so insanity can be por-
trayed as an "Excuse" defense).
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doubt about his ability to form the requisite mens rea of the charged of-
fense since a mental disease or defect alone does not otherwise constitute
a defense.210 Because Texas does not have a presumption of sanity, the
defendant bears the burden of proving insanity by a preponderance of the
evidence.211
In addition to proving that he did not appreciate the wrongfulness of
his act in order to prevail, the defendant must also demonstrate that his
mental incapacity existed at the time of the conduct and his lack of cogni-
tion was the result of a severe mental disease or defect.212 Nevertheless,
the growing public sentiments that "justice is not being done" or that
"people are getting away with murder" ' are now giving rise to a more
punitive attitude, particularly regarding use of an insanity plea. The
insanity defense curbs this need to punish offenders and exact
retribution.214
C. The "Excuse" Defense
1. Diminished Capacity (Partial Responsibility)
The concept of diminished capacity or partial responsibility is over-
broad, including not only mental diseases and defects but also any condi-
210. See RAMxY, supra note 206, at 242 (contending, as a fundamental principle of
criminal justice, an individual can be held criminally responsible for his conduct only when
he acts with a guilty mind or some level of culpability so as to have acted voluntarily);
diGenova & Toensing, supra note 150, at 731.
211. See Whatley, supra note 151, at 7 (noting that, if the defendant successfully
proves insanity by a preponderance of the evidence, then the burden shifts to the State to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was sane enough to possess the requi-
site mental state for the offense charged, in addition to proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant had the specific type of criminal intent required for the crime charged);
REAMEY, supra note 206, at 243 (stating the defendant bears the burden of production to
raise the issue of insanity and the burden of persuasion to convince the fact-finder that a
preponderance of the evidence supports his defense); see also Clark v. State, 588 P.2d 1027,
1030 (Nev. 1979).
212. See REAMEY, supra note 206, at 244 (postulating that timing of a defendant's
incapacity is critical, as well as the severity of his mental disease or defect, so that only the
most obviously deranged defendants are entitled to the insanity defense); Dent, supra note
198, at 356.
213. See diGenova & Toensing, supra note 150, at 734 (quoting W. Gaylin, Legal In-
sanity: Gone Bonkers, WASH. Posr, June 20, 1982, at Cl); Farabee & Spearly, supra note
203, at 676 (commenting that the author, Senator Farabee, was "confused and outraged by
a legal system that could excuse from responsibility a person who committed an act of
violence in what appeared to be a conscious and premeditated manner"); Rappeport, supra
note 150, at 693.
214. See Rappeport, supra note 150, at 689 (asserting that changing the insanity de-
fense will do nothing to eliminate crime, and that if insane persons are tried and convicted
it will be done in the name of public concern about violent crime).
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tion that prevents formations of the requisite mens rea (i.e.,
intoxication).215 Unlike the insanity defense, diminished capacity reduces
the level of criminal responsibility rather than excluding criminal respon-
sibility altogether.216 Theoretically, a defendant suffering from an abnor-
mal mental condition insufficient to warrant an insanity defense at the
time of the conduct is ineligible for a finding of "not guilty by reason of
insanity."217 Nevertheless, his mental abnormality is still a relevant factor
in the determination of his guilt."' Thus, evidence about the defendant's
mental condition is admissible on the question of whether he possessed
the requisite mental state as an element of the charged offense 219
Though the defendant may not be guilty of the charged offense, he can
still be convicted of lesser offenses that result in imprisonment rather
than a commitment in a mental institution from a successful insanity
defense. 20
Opponents of the diminished capacity theory question the trustworthi-
ness of psychiatric testimony on the issue of mens rea, noting that the
fact-finder becomes dependant upon evidence of limited reliability. 21
Yet this problem can be resolved if the trial judge initially determines
whether such evidence has sufficient scientific support to warrant its use
and would help the jury determine key issues. In cases of infanticide,
the concept of diminished capacity avoids a claim of insanity and poten-
tially reduces charges of murder to manslaughter, resulting in rehabilita-
tive confinement rather than penal incarceration.223 This result most
closely fits the rubric of therapeutic jurisprudence by making a legal judg-
215. See White v State, 456 P.2d 797, 803 (Idaho 1969).
216. See id.
217. See LAFAvE & Scorr, JR., supra note 151, at 522.
218. See id.
219. See id. at 530-31 (noting that otherwise, such offenses charged would effectively
become strict liability offenses when applied to abnormal defendants); see also diGenova
& Toensing, supra note 150, at 731-32 (establishing that motive is not usually a relevant
consideration in murder).
220. See LAFAVE & Scorr, JR., supra note 151, at 523; Barton, supra note 180, at 601;
see also Baran, supra note 158, at 135-36.
221. See LAFAvE & Scorr, JR., supra note 151, at 531; Baran, supra note 158, at 135.
222. See LAFAVE & Sco-rr, JR., supra note 151, at 531; Ford, supra note 161, at 532
(observing that psychiatric testimony regarding defendant's mens rea resolves key issues by
explaining or excusing the defendant's behavior, the reasonableness of which is to be de-
termined from the viewpoint of the actor and under circumstances as he had believed them
to have been); see also Arenella, supra note 188, at 829-30 (describing the formal mitiga-
tion model which opens the courtroom doors to most expert psychological testimony).
223. See ScHwAWRTz & ISSER, supra note 63, at 109 (recognizing the guilty but men-
tally ill verdict as the medium option between guilt and total innocence of the crime where
the evidence in question is insufficient to satisfy any of the standard insanity tests); Barton,
supra note 180, at 601; Ford, supra note 161, at 533.
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ment with an awareness of mental health implications, sentencing diffi-
culties, and the offenders' rehabilitation needs. 2
24
2. Automatism
Likewise, the automatism defense is similar to the non-volitional aspect
underlying the doctrine of diminished capacity. Noting that a defendant
who engaged in otherwise criminal conduct is not guilty of a crime if he
did so in a state of unconsciousness or semi-consciousness, the theory of
automatism implies a disturbance of the consciousness which compels the
individual to take involuntary action.2 2 5 The underlying rationale is not
so much that the defendant lacks the necessary mental state for commis-
sion of the charged offense, but that the defendant has not engaged in a
voluntary act.226 Raised as a defense in cases involving epilepsy, hypno-
tism, concussion, emotional trauma, or Premenstrual Syndrome,22 7 au-
tomatism is a distinct entity which has often been mistakenly labeled as
another facet of the insanity defense.228 Automatism may be present
even if the defendant lacks a mental disease or defect, a key element of
224. See SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 63, at 109; Barton, supra note 180, at 601.
The concept of diminished capacity can be paralleled to Extreme Mental and Emotional
Disorder found in the Model Penal Code § 210.3(b). SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 63, at
108. As a legal construct, rather than a psychiatric or psychological approach, an extreme
mental and emotional disorder is usually based on long-standing, internal stresses that lead
a homicidal mother to some "reasonable excuse for the emotional disturbance" and subse-
quent homicide, resulting in a reduced charge or penalty as a partial defense. hM.
225. See LAFAVE & Scorr, JR., supra note 151, at 541-43. One who is not conscious
or aware of what he is doing is not criminally responsible for killing a person in a clouded
state somewhere between wakefulness and sleep. See id. For example, this state of uncon-
sciousness can be demonstrated in "blacking out" without warning when driving and hit-
ting a pedestrian without previous notice as to warrant criminal negligence. People v.
Froom, 108 Cal. App. 3d 820 (1980); Polston v. State, 685 P.2d 1 (Wyo. 1981); Fulcher v.
State, 633 P.2d 142 (Wyo. 1981); LAFAvE & Scorr, JR., supra note 151, at 542-43.
226. See LAFAvE & Scorr, JR., supra note 151, at 542-44 (noting that a defendant is
not guilty of a crime because he has not engaged in an "act," and without an act there can
be no crime).
227. See id. at 543 (declaring the Premenstrual Syndrome is a physiological disorder
that may fit more closely within the automatism defense since it is not a disease or defect of
the mind, even though Premenstrual Syndrome can render a woman unable to control her
actions for a short period); Button, supra note 110, at 340. However, there is little case law
on the subject of the automatism defense, which excludes sudden memory relapse from
amnesia, multiple personality disorders, or brainwashing. LAFAvE & Sco-rr, JR., supra
note 151, at 544.
228. See LAFAVE & Scorr, JR., supra note 151, at 544; Button, supra note 110, at 330-
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the insanity defense, and may result in an outright acquittal rather than
commitment.229
Opponents of the automatism defense contend that automatism broad-
ens the definition of a "disease of the mind" to essentially expand the
insanity defense. Yet a defendant who has acted unconsciously due to a
physical or organic disorder should not be limited solely to a defense that
can result in commitment intended for the mentally ill. Advocates of the
automatism defense propose that a defendant who is acquitted due to an
automatism defense can alternatively be released upon receipt of medical
treatment necessary to prevent repetitious behavior in the future?. 30
V. GENDER AND CRIMINAL LAW
"A woman in prison is not a dangerous man."231
Headline, The New York Tittes Magazine, July 3, 1996
A. Punishment
1. Influence of Gender Stereotype
The word "mother" invokes a symbol of warmth and nurture, an em-
bodiment of nature's ultimate caregiver. Throughout history and myth,
women have been perceived either as Eve, the wanton temptress, or as
the "mother," virginal and pure.P2 Because the universal culture views a
mother as self-sacrificing, compassionate, caring, and loving, we often
confuse the notion of a "good mother" with that of a "good woman."" 3
Mothers who killed their children, having committed such an "unnatural
act," were thus considered mad or evil.4 Likewise, some may consider
such a mother as having violated her cultural image as a life-giver, and
therefore seek to punish her more severely than a man for breaking the
hedonic bond between mother and child'3 5
229. See LAFAVE & Scorr, JR., supra note 151, at 544-46 (noting that a defendant
only has to produce evidence raising doubt as to his consciousness at the time of the al-
leged crime); Button, supra note 110, at 330.
230. See LAFAvE & ScoTr, JR., supra note 151, at 549.
231. PEARSON, supra note 61, at 201.
232. See SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 63, at 3; Ford, supra note 161, at 534.
233. See ScHwARTz & ISSER, supra note 63, at 3; Denno, supra note 196, at 160.
234. See MEYER Er AL., supra note 74, at 69-70 (mentioning that women who kill their
children are regarded as having committed the ultimate sin in most societies, including our
own); ScHwARTz & IssER, supra note 63, at 3 (theorizing that a woman's problems were
traditionally thought to have been caused by gender and biology which, as indicators of her
inherent vulnerability and inferiority from the male sex, required her to seek protection
from the world outside of the domestic sphere).
235. See ScHWARTz & ISSER, supra note 63, at 81.
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Under our criminal justice system, women were often judged not sim-
ply on the basis of their legal infractions, but also for their compliance or
variance from stereotypical female behavior.236 This prejudice was espe-
cially true in cases of neonaticide and infanticide because these crimes
contradicted the very concepts of motherhood and femininity. Such ste-
reotypes affect the ways in which we characterize and punish women.
As a fundamental percept of our criminal law, a person is only punisha-
ble for a crime if he can be held morally responsible." 7 A woman who
commits infanticide while suffering from postpartum psychosis cannot be
held morally culpable if she fell victim to something which she could not
control, so punishment under such circumstances would be inappropri-
ate." 8 Theoretically, punishment functions to achieve prevention, re-
straint, rehabilitation, and deterrence.239 What do we seek to gain by
punishing a woman who has killed her child while suffering from postpar-
tum psychosis?
Prevention and deterrence seek to subject individuals to an unpleasant
experience so that they will be less likely to commit other crimes in the
future,240 but this objective will only be effective if individuals receiving
punishment are actually able to prevent themselves from committing fu-
ture offenses. Mothers suffering from a mental illness, such as postpar-
tum psychosis, over which they exercise no control, are unlikely to
achieve prevention or deterrence without receiving the treatment neces-
sary to avoid repetitive behavior or symptoms.
In terms of rehabilitation, the mental health services needed are more
accessible outside of prison and can be required as a condition of proba-
tion.241 Retribution is predicated on society's right to punish one who is
to blame for the unjustified taking of life,242 but can we allocate blame to
236. See id. at 3 (observing that women who failed to conform to assumed gender
characteristics were perceived as "bad"); Denno, supra note 196, at 160.
237. See SLOVENKO, supra note 148, at 6-7; Brusca, supra note 110, at 1149-51; see also
SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 63, at 103.
238. See SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 63, at 103.
239. See LAFAVE & ScoT, JR., supra note 151, at 431.
240. See id.; MEYER ET AL., supra note 74, at 174; SCHWARTZ & IsSER, supra note 63,
at 74 (distinguishing infanticide undoubtedly is a crime even in its most basic definition,
but there is little or no evidence to support imprisonment as an effective deterrent).
241. See MEYER ET AL., supra note 74, at 175-76 (expounding that tile British system
requires women who commit infanticide to receive counseling in order to be eligible for
probation); SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 63, at 111-16 (suggesting that proposed alter-
natives include sentencing in combination with mandatory psychotherapy or counseling,
even tying in community service with probation as an option to educate other young
mothers or teenagers).




a single individual under such circumstances? Infanticides committed by
mothers while suffering from postpartum psychosis are tragically prevent-
able and cannot be attributed to one person alone.243 Killings induced by
postpartum psychosis are caused by a mental and physical illness beyond
the mother's control, a result for which the mother alone is ultimately
held both legally and personally accountable.2 "
Historically, laws were passed in order to affect moral and social be-
havior by punishing single women for becoming pregnant and for refus-
ing to live with their sins by committing infanticide. For example, during
the late medieval period, the Roman Catholic Church ascribed heavy
punishments for infanticide, but such laws were addressed only to wo-
men.245 From simple beheadings or burnings to live burials, 4 ' women
were singled out as the sole responsible party to bear the stigma and pun-
ishment of infanticide.
Today, some may argue that fathers as opposed to mothers are gener-
ally punished more severely because gender stereotypes and cultural
images of women are more apt to affect public sympathy2 47 However, in
practice, no equal responsibility is applied, as males simply disappear into
the landscape, escaping social opprobrium and responsibility as well as
any general notice or attention.24 Upon further examination, we must
question whether penalties of the past are at all different from our treat-
ment of mothers who kill their children today.
243. See Attia et al., supra note 85, at 113 (commenting on the failure of a mother's
social network to provide her with adequate support).
244. See EwING, supra note 51, at 65. Research conducted by Dr. Daniel Katkin of
the University of Pennsylvania revealed that approximately half of those who used a post-
partum depression defense were found guilty of infanticide. See id. He claimed these sta-
tistics supported the notion that women were ultimately deemed to be legally responsible
for such reprehensible acts. Id.
245. See SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 63, at 35-36 (noting that such rules created
by the Roman Catholic Church never applied to men or even both parents).
246. See id. The Holy Roman Empire called for live burial, drowning, or impaling.
but such practice was replaced in the seventeenth century by torture and decapitation.
Likewise, mothers found guilty of infanticide were burned or buried alive after intense
torture in late medieval France. Id.
247. See id. at 89.
248. See id. at 87-89 (detailing how the father is more often nowhere to be found or
gets a slap on the wrist, particularly in cases involving neonaticide, whereas the woman is
sent to prison); Denno, supra note 196, at 160 (listing factors which render the postpartum
psychosis defense unique: the only victims are infants, the only defendants are women,
and pregnancy is the only condition by which the disorder can be initiated); see also Bar-




Because each state has its own laws, discrepancies and inconsistencies
in sentencing depend on the rule of precedent and nature of the state
law.24 9 In the absence of a federal law to act as a guideline, it is doubtful
that a uniform policy encompassing society's humanitarian response to
infanticides caused by postpartum psychosis will soon emerge.250 Virtu-
ally relying upon the "luck of the draw," sentences for mothers who killed
their children while suffering from postpartum psychosis vary from pro-
bation to between eight and twenty years imprisonment.251 In addition to
demonstrating disparity in sentencing, relevant case law also illustrates
bias and the variety of emotions which infanticide may engender.252
In State v. Kowalewsky,1 3 the defendant suffered from severe depres-
sion in conjunction with postpartum psychosis. 5 4 When her husband de-
nied paternity of their newborn, the defendant killed the child by forcing
it to ingest a household disinfectant.255 Though the defendant was con-
victed by a jury, the appellate court noted that "any woman who could
kill her only child must have suffered a mental derangement and should
not be punished" but helped instead; thus the defendant was given a re-
duced sentence due to mitigating circumstances surrounding the child's
death.5 6
249. See ScnwARarz & ISSER, supra note 63, at 77 (emphasizing that the same murder
by the same mother could receive different treatment depending on the jurisdiction's laws,
particular jury, or even the beliefs of a particular judge).
250. See id. at 85-86 (noting the usual sentence for a woman who commits infanticide
as a result of postpartum psychosis contains no provisions for helping her to understand or
cope with her conduct, much less to educate her to prevent repetitive behavior); Barton,
supra note 180, at 619.
251. See EWING, supra note 51, at 66 (recognizing that sentencings of mothers who
have committed infanticide while suffering from postpartum psychosis are dependent on a
sympathetic judge or jury).
252. See People v. Sims, 750 N.E.2d 320, 322-25 (I1. App. Ct. 2001). "Rather than
nurture her two baby girls, she [defendant] killed them." Id. at 322. Even though the State
".... endeavor[ed] to make Paula pay for her misdeeds in kind[,] [hie [defense attorney]
spoiled the State's effort to set a date with death." Id. The opinion noted "Paula [defen-
dant] confessed her sins" and "her murderous bent was the by-product of postpartum psy-
chosis." Id. at 324-25; see also State v. Kowalewsky, 24 Ohio Law Abs. 612, 615 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1937). Prior to sentencing, the trial court in State v. Kowalewsky characterized the
defendant as "a fiend and a monster" before the jury. Kowalewsky, 24 Ohio Law Abs. at
615.
253. 24 Ohio Law Abs. 612 (Ohio Ct. App. 1937).
254. See Kowalewsky, 24 Ohio Law Abs. at 614; Lentz, supra note 64, at 534 (stating
that the nineteen-year-old mother was convicted of second-degree murder and conse-
quently sentenced to life imprisonment for the death of her two-day-old son).
255. See Kowalewsky, 24 Ohio Law Abs. at 613-14; Lentz, supra note 64, at 534.
256. See Kowalewsky, 24 Ohio Law Abs. at 618-19; Lentz, supra note 64, at 535,
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A similar defendant in Commonwealth v. Conitz,?7 however, was sen-
tenced to eight to twenty years imprisonment upon conviction of third
degree murder for the killing of her child. 58 The Superior Court of
Pennsylvania affirmed the sentence, noting that a mental illness which
supported a plea of "guilty but mentally ill" did not constitute a substan-
tial ground excusing criminal conduct and warranting probation as a mat-
ter of law.5 9 Because discretion in weighing mental illness as an excuse
for criminal conduct during sentencing lies entirely within the province of
the trial court, the Superior Court reiterated that the defendant posed a
future threat to society as a result of her current mental illness, rather
than her mental condition at the time of the murder.2 °
In People v. Massip,261 the defendant, suffering from severe postpar-
tum psychosis and distraught over the newborn's colic-induced crying,
threw both the child and herself into oncoming traffic. 26 When her at-
tempt proved unsuccessful, the defendant struck the child on the head
with a blunt object and ran over the newborn twice with her car.26 De-
spite a conviction by the jury, the trial court overturned the jury verdict
and acquitted the defendant on grounds of temporary insanity.2 4 Order-
ing the defendant to undergo at least one year of outpatient therapy to
recover from postpartum psychosis, the trial judge reasoned that the re-
257. 530 A.2d 473 (Penn. 1987).
258. See Comitz, 530 A.2d at 474; Lentz, supra note 64, at 535 (observing that the
forensic psychiatrist termed the mother insane when she dropped her one-month-old son
into a stream); Schroeder, supra note 110, at 286-87 (asserting that the defendant initially
claimed her son had been kidnapped from her car at a local shopping center).
259. See Comitz, 530 A.2d at 477; Lentz, supra note 64, at 541 (recalling the trial court
used the fact that postpartum psychosis was not listed in DSM-III as a reason for excluding
medical testimony about postpartum psychosis as a mental illness); see also Schroeder,
supra note 110, at 286-87 (arguing the mere fact that a coherent kidnapping story was
concocted does not necessarily mean that a mother suffering from postpartum psychosis
was thinking rationally). Although etiologies of postpartum disorders have not been fully
discerned, it has been listed at least as a separate entity recognized by the medical profes-
sion in DSM-IV. See Lentz, supra note 64, at 541.
260. See Comitz, 530 Ai2d at 477-78; Lentz, supra note 64, at 535; see also Schroeder,
supra note 110, at 286-87 (asserting the trial court had accepted the defendant's guilty plea
and found her to be mentally ill at the time of the offense).
261. 271 Cal. Rptr. 868 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
262. See Massip, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 868-69; Lentz, supra note 64, at 536; Schroeder,
supra note 110, at 279; Debra Cassens Moss, Postpartum Psychosis Defense New Defen-
sive Measure for Mothers Who Kill, 74 A.B.A. J. 22, Aug. 1, 1988, available at LEXSEE 74
A.B.A.J. 22.
263. See Massip, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 869; Lentz, supra note 64, at 536; Schroeder, supra
note 110, at 279; Moss, supra note 262; Debra Cassens Moss, Postpartun: Psychosis De-
fense Succeeds 75 A.B.A. J. 40, Feb. 1989, available at LEXSEE 75 A.B.A. J. 40.
264. See Massip, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 869; Lentz, supra note 64, at 536-37; Schroeder,
supra note 110, at 280-81; Moss, supra note 263.
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cord clearly indicated the defendant was obviously emotionally dis-
turbed.265 Upon further review, the appellate court concluded that the
trial judge had exceeded the bounds of his authority but nevertheless af-
firmed the defendant's acquittal on a technicality.266 Upon review,267 the
California Supreme Court instructed the Court of Appeals to vacate and
reconsider its decision in light of People v. Saille.268 On remand, the case
was later voluntarily dismissed.2 69
In a return to a classic example illustrating the effects of postpartum
psychosis discussed previously, Angela Thompson was charged with man-
slaughter and felony child abuse for the killing of her child. °70 Acquitted
by reason of insanity, Thompson was ordered to spend ninety days at a
psychiatric halfway house and to undergo years of outpatient psychiatric
counseling.27' When she gave birth to another child, Thompson was well-
265. See Massip, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 869; Lentz, supra note 64, at 537; Schroeder, supra
note 110, at 280-81; Moss, supra note 262 (noting that the defendant, previously described
as a "passive, easy-going, mellow person" before her son was born, was diagnosed with
postpartum psychosis and heard voices instructing her to kill the child because he was the
devil); see also Moss, supra note 263.
266. See Massip, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 870; EwING, supra note 51, at 57-58 (stating the
acquittal was affirmed because the prosecutors had waited an unreasonable length of time
before bringing forth an appeal so that the delay would in effect disrupt the defendant's
progress in rehabilitation and treatment); Lentz, supra note 64, at 536 (noting the trial
judge only had power to order a new trial on the sanity issue); Schroeder, supra note 110,
at 279-81 (discussing the Massip case and the judge's determination that went against the
jury verdict); Moss, supra note 263 (contemplating the effect of allowing a judge to replace
a jury verdict with his own opinion).
267. People v. Massip, 274 Cal. Rptr. 369 (Cal. 1990).
268. See People v. Massip, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 762 (Cal. 1992); People v. Saille, 2 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 364, 369-373 (Cal. 1991) (holding that California law no longer permits reduction
of what would be murder to voluntary manslaughter, as the trial court in the Massip case
had done).
269. See Schroeder, supra note 110, at 281. Characterized as a "happy, healthy, nonvi-
olent person who looked forward to motherhood," Massip took a class oin infant care and
diligently sought medical help for her son's frequent crying. Id. at 280-81. Almost immedi-
ately after Michael's birth, Massip began to experience feelings of confusion and worthless-
ness, suicidal ideations, hallucinations, and could neither sleep nor eat. Id. at 277-80.
Hearing Michael's cries even in his absence and feeling walls and ceilings of rooms moving
all around her, Massip visited her obstetrician thinking that she was having a nervous
breakdown; her doctor merely prescribed her tranquilizers. Id. at 280. Describing "voices
in her head telling her Michael was in pain and that she must put him out of his misery,"
Massip "felt as if she were in a tunnel and everything was moving slowly... [seeing her
son] as a doll or an object, not a person." Id. Placing the infant's corpse in a trash can and
later claiming that the child had been kidnapped, Massip confessed what she had done to
her husband while they waited at the police station. Id.
270. See EWING, supra note 51, at 64; Schroeder, supra note 110, at 282-83.
271. See EwING, supra note 51, at 63-64; Lentz, supra note 64, at 538; Schroeder, supra
note 110, at 282-83.
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prepared to handle symptoms of postpartum psychosis, and both mother
and child survived.2 72
B. Legal Recognition of Postpartum Psychosis
1. A Gender-Specific Defense?
A postpartum psychosis defense can be seen as a notable exception to
the principle of equality under the law.2" Because underlying causes 7 4
of postpartum psychosis are unique only to women, use of the postpar-
tum defense should also be sex-specific as mandated by the natural order
of biology.275 Some may contend that an exclusively female defense
would encourage sexism and promote the notion that women should not
be accorded full responsibility for their actions due to the inherent weak-
nesses of their sex.276 However, to insist that a mother's actions commit-
ted while suffering from postpartum psychosis be judged equally to the
actions of a man who is not inflicted by such mental illness is not only
absurd, but also impossible.2 " There is no need to hide behind a shield
of "special treatment" when the law focuses on a mental disturbance that
prevents the defendant from forming the specific intent to kill, as op-
272. See Ewn'G, supra note 51, at 64-65 (commenting on how Thompson handled
symptoms of postpartum depression with the constant monitoring of medical professionals
and family and has since then created a statewide program to help law enforcement au-
thorities identify and deal with mothers who suffer from postpartum depression); Brusca,
supra note 110, at 1164 (observing that Thompson has since given birth to another son and
sought to publicize the problem of postpartum psychosis); Lentz, supra note 64, at 537-38;
Schroeder, supra note 110, at 282-83; Reece, supra note 110, at 750 (noting Thompson
underwent hormonal treatments and supervision to prevent a recurrence of postpartum
psychosis with the birth of her third child).
273. See Kumar & Marks, supra note 145, at 257.
274. Symptoms and causes of postpartum psychosis include hormonal changes, steroid
metabolism, feelings of maternal inadequacy, and lack of social support in caring for the
newborn.
275. See Lentz, supra note 64, at 543.
276. See ScHswArz & ISSER, supra note 63, at 3. Many see this defense as an anti-
female argument under the belief that reproduction and lactation-produced emotional dis-
turbance may legitimize the notion that women are inherently unstable because of their
biology, this notion, of course, has implications for the integration of women into the world
outside of the domestic sphere. See id. Feminists see infanticide laws as a way of giving
women "special treatment" based on the notion that women are naturally susceptible to
mental instability as a result of the biology of their sex (i.e., capability of giving birth). Id.
at 37-38; see also Lentz, supra note 64, at 543-44; Edith J. Naselli-Carpenter, No Death
Penalty for Victim of Depression, CHICAGo DAiLY HERALD, Sept. 23,2001, at 17, available
at 2001 WL 28538281.
277. See SCHwARTZ & IssER, supra note 63, at 113 (noting that infanticide itself is not
a sex-specific offense, having been committed by both men and women alike throughout
history and even today); Hans S. Nichols et al., Feminists Scrap About Mother Who Killed
Children, INsirGH MAC., Oct. 1, 2001, at 6, available at 2001 WL 29584682.
2002]
THE SCHOLAR
posed to the fact that such a defendant happens to be a woman."' 8 Any
disparity in the treatment of women who kill their children while suffer-
ing from postpartum psychosis lies in the recognition of a definitive link
between the onslaught of childbirth and the subsequent development of a
postpartum mental illness that may cause such individuals to kill while
their "balance of mind is disturbed." 279
As established in English common law for centuries, the concept of
legal insanity acknowledges that an individual who does not know what
he is doing, or that what he is doing is wrong, cannot be held criminally
liable.2s° Thus, recognition of symptoms of postpartum psychosis and in-
fanticide, as a distinct form of homicide, led Great Britain to formulate
infanticide statutes in 1922 and 1938.281 According to the British Infanti-
cide Act of 1922, a mother who kills her infant during its first year of life
cannot be convicted of murder but only manslaughter, upon the showing
of a postpartum mental disorder. The defendant's diminished capacity at
the time of the act reduces the charge from murder to manslaughter; thus
the trial court has greater flexibility in the determination of sentencing,
ranging from life imprisonment to psychiatric treatment.28 2 Therefore,
the mother generally receives a probationary sentence in combination
with healthcare interventions instead of a prison sentence.283
The British Infanticide Acts have been replicated in slightly varying
forms in at least twenty-two other countries, including Australia and Ca-
278. See Lentz, supra note 64, at 543-44.
279. See MEYER Er AL., supra note 74, at 11 (noting the British Infanticide Act of
1922 explicitly recognized that infanticide often occurs because "the balance of her
[mother's] mind [is] disturbed by reason of her not having fully recovered from the effect
of giving birth to the child"); Kumar & Marks, supra note 145, at 257 (emphasizing that a
definite causal link between the process of reproduction and the occurrence of mental
illness must first be established); O'Hara, supra note 96, at 10-20.
280. See Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 80 (Nev. 2001).
281. See EWING, supra note 51, at 66; Lentz, supra note 64, at 537 (stating the British
Infanticide Acts are also based on the concept of diminished responsibility to acquit or
mitigate); MEYER ET AL, supra note 74, at 11; ScHWARz & IssER, supra note 63, at 84;
O'Hara, supra note 96, at 10-20.
282. See Lentz, supra note 64, at 537-39.
283. See EWING, supra note 51, at 66; MEYER ET AL., supra note 74, at 11; SCHWARTZ
& ISSER, supra note 63, at 82 (recognizing involuntary manslaughter generally governs
"unlawful killings that did not involve malice aforethought ... where the defendant's con-
duct lacked a murderous intent, but involved a high degree of risk of death or serious
bodily injury to the victim"). The British Infanticide Act of 1938 amends the 1922 act by
allowing for environmental or other traumatic stresses, tending to specifically regard ne-
onaticide and infanticide to lesser degrees as events which, due to psychological disorders,
require treatment rather than punishment. SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 63, at 84-85.
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nada. 4 In Australia, a discretionary sentence for women who became
"temporarily deranged" due to the after-effects of childbirth may offer a
humane means of dealing with the problem of infanticide.3' Likewise,
Canada, as a derivative of British law, sees a homicidal mother suffering
from postpartum psychosis as more of a threat to herself than to society.
In contrast, American law does not recognize infanticide as a separate
category of crime, nor are there medical models for understanding infan-
ticide or symptoms of postpartum psychosis. 6 Despite Congressional
acknowledgment that postpartum psychosis is a common and serious
problem, little seems to have been done to deal with this mental illness:
All too often postpartum depression goes undiagnosed or untreated
due to social stigma surrounding depression and mental illness, the
myth of motherhood, the new mother's inability to self-diagnose her
condition, the new mother's shame or embarrassment over discuss-
ing her depression so near to the birth of her child, the lack of under-
standing in society and the medical community of the complexity of
postpartum depression, and economic pressures placed on hospital
providers. Untreated, postpartum depression impacts society
through its affect on the infant's physical and psychological develop-
ment, child abuse, neglect, or death of the infant or other siblings,
and the disruption of the family. s
The only legal recognition which postpartum psychosis has successfully
attained has been a meager acknowledgement of postpartum psychosis as
a debilitating and serious medical condition when applied to concepts of
damages, proximate cause, and negligence in civil case law. s There is
still no American law which requires consideration of a mother's mental
state when she committed neonaticide or infanticide while suffering from
postpartum psychosis, aside from the ordinary concerns in homicide cases
284. See MEYER E AI., supra note 74, at 11; ScinVARTZ & ISSER, supra note 63, at 84;
NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMMISSION, REPORT No. 82 PARTIAL DEFENsEs To
MURDER DIMSHED REsPoNsmiL'ry § 2.6 (1997).
285. See NEw SoUr WA.s LAW REFORM COMMISSION, supra note 284, §§ 3.22-24
(applying concepts of diminished responsibility where the mind is disturbed after child-
birth); Lentz, supra note 64, at 539 (noting the English method of dealing with infanticidal
mothers).
286. See MEYER ET AL., supra note 74, at 13; ScHwARw-z & IssER, supra note 63, at 85;
Lentz, supra note 64, at 530.
287. LR. 2380, 107th Cong. (2001).
288. See, e.g., Schuler v. Berger, 395 F.2d 212,213 (3d Cir. 1968); Murray v. St. Mary's
Hosp., 280 A.D. 803, 804 (N.Y. App. Div. 1952).
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regarding the mother's ability to "appreciate" and "know" the wrongful-
ness of her conduct at the time of the act.289
2. The Texas Approach
Texas Penal Code section 6.01 requires proof that a person's death has
occurred and that such death was the result of the criminal act or agency
of another, otherwise known as corpus delicti.290 A culpable mental state
in conjunction with the commission of a voluntary act is also essential in
order for the act to qualify as a "homicide."'291 According to section
19.03 of the Texas Penal Code, the act of killing a child under the age of
six, otherwise known as infanticide, is considered a capital felony if re-
quirements for murder are met under Texas Penal Code section 19.02.29
Thus, mandatory punishment for a capital felony, and infanticide alike,
289. See SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 63, at 85; Goldstein, supra note 146, at 126-
27; Lentz, supra note 64, at 530.
290. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 6.01, 6.02 (Vernon 2001); Catherine L. Golden-
berg, Sudden Infant Death Syndrome as a Mask for Murder: Investigating and Prosecuting
Infanticide, 28 Sw. U. L. REv. 599, 613-16 (1999); Jennifer L. Grossman, Note, Postpartum
Psychosis: A Defense to Criminal Responsibility or Just Another Gimmick?, 67 U. DET. L.
REv. 311,317 (1990). Derived from its Latin origin as "body of the crime," Corpus Delicti
is defined as the fact that a transgression has taken place or the physical evidence demon-
strating that a crime has been committed. See BLACK's LAW DIcnoNARY 346 (7th ed.
1999).
291. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 6.01, 6.02 (Vernon 2001); REAMEY, supra note
206, at 213-17 (stating that homicides are classified as murder, capital murder, "heat of
passion" killing, manslaughter, and criminally negligent homicide).
292. See Tax. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02 (Vernon 2001) (noting the following as re-
quirements of murder: intentionally or knowingly causes death of another, intends serious
bodily injury and acts clearly dangerous to human life results in death, or if death of some-
one occurs during commission of a felony other than manslaughter (felony murder)); TEx.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (Vernon 2001); REAMEY, supra note 206, at 214-15 (emphasiz-
ing the criminal intent requirement to commit or attempt to commit the offense and proof
of specific intent to cause the death of an individual in the course of carrying out that
intent even though proof of that specific intent does not necessarily mean that the defen-
dant acted deliberately). Section 19.02, Murder, states:
(a) In this section:
(1) "Adequate cause" means cause that would commonly produce a degree of
anger, rage, resentment, or terror in a person of ordinary temper, sufficient to
render the mind incapable of cool reflection.
(2) "Sudden passion" means passion directly caused by and arising out of provo-
cation by the individual killed or another acting with the person killed which
passion arises at the time of the offense and is not solely the result of former
provocation.
(b) A person commits an offense if he:
(1) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual;
(2) intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to
human life that causes the death of an individual; or
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under Texas Penal Code section 12.31 warrants either life imprisonment
or the death penalty, neither of which the State can waive.293
(3) commits or attempts to commit a felony, other than manslaughter, and in the
course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempt, or in immediate
flight from the commission or attempt, he commits or attempts to commit an
act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual.
(c) Except as provided by Subsection (d), an offense under this section is a felony of
the first degree.
(d) At the punishment stage of a trial, the defendant may raise the issue as to whether
he caused the death under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from
an adequate cause. If the defendant proves the issue in the affirmative by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, the offense is a felony of the second degree.
TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02 (Vernon 2001). Section 19.03, Capital Murder, observes:
(a) A person commits an offense if he commits murder as defined under Section
19.02(b)(1) and:
(1) the person murders a peace officer or fireman who is acting in the lawful dis-
charge of an official duty and who the person knows is a peace officer or
fireman;
(2) the person intentionally commits the murder in the course of committing or
attempting to commit kidnapping, burglary, robbery, aggravated sexual as-
sault, arson, or obstruction or retaliation;
(3) the person commits the murder for remuneration or the promise of remunera-
tion or employs another to commit the murder for remuneration or the prom-
ise of remuneration;
(4) the person commits the murder while escaping or attempting to escape from a
penal institution;
(5) the person, while incarcerated in a penal institution, murders another.
(A) who is employed in the operation of the penal institution; or
(B) with the intent to establish, maintain, or participate in a combination or
in the profits of a combination;
(6) the person:
(A) while incarcerated for an offense under this section or Section 19.02,
murders another, or
(B) while serving a sentence of life imprisonment or a term of 99 years for an
offense under Section 20.04, 22.021, or 29.03, murders another,
(7) the person murders more than one person:
(A) during the same criminal transaction; or
(B) during different criminal transactions but the murders are committed pur-
suant to the same scheme or course of conduct; or
(8) the person murders an individual under six years of age.
(b) An offense under this section is a capital felony.
(c) If the jury or, when authorized by law, the judge does not find beyond a reasona-
ble doubt that the defendant is guilty of an offense under this section, he may be
convicted of murder or any other lesser included offense.
Tax. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (Vernon 2001).
293. See Tax. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31 (Vernon 2001); REim~v, stupra note 206, at
215. Section 12.31, Capital Felony, observes:
(a) An individual adjudged guilty of a capital felony in a case in which the State seeks
the death penalty shall be punished by imprisonment in the institutional division
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In order to merit the death penalty, the jury must find beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that (1) the defendant's conduct which caused the victim's
death was deliberate with a reasonable expectation that death would re-
sult, (2) it is highly probable that a defendant would commit such criminal
acts of violence again as to pose a continuing threat to society, and (3) the
defendant's conduct was unreasonable, even if in response to provoca-
tion. 94 The acts of a mother committed while suffering from postpartum
psychosis, however, do not appear to necessitate a punishment as severe
as the death penalty nor imprisonment since she does not pose a continu-
ous threat to society, herself, or any children she may have in the future if
necessary treatment is received."9 ' What purpose of punishment do we
serve by punishing mothers for acts committed while suffering from post-
partum psychosis? To achieve an illusion of justice, what will imprison-
ment or the death penalty accomplish aside from venting society's
feelings of outrage and revenge?
VI. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
"With regard to the public, [infanticide] causes no alarm, because it is
a crime which can be committed only by mothers upon their newly
born children."
296
Sir James FitzJames Stephen, eighteenth-century jurist
for life or by death. An individual adjudged guilty of a capital felony in a case in
which the State does not seek the death penalty shall be punished by imprison-
ment in the institutional division for life.
(b) In a capital felony trial in which the State seeks the death penalty, prospective
jurors shall be informed that a sentence of life imprisonment or death is
mandatory on conviction of a capital felony. In a capital felony trial in which the
State does not seek the death penalty, prospective jurors shall be informed that
the State is not seeking the death penalty and that a sentence of life imprisonment
is mandatory on conviction of the capital felony.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31 (Vernon 2001).
294. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31 (Vernon 2001); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROc.
ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon 2001); REAMEY, supra note 206, at 215 (noting the jury cannot
convict the defendant of murder or other lesser included offenses if it cannot find all of
these elements).
295. This argument can be substantiated by the Thompson case. Prosecutors seeking
the death penalty for Yates under the aforementioned sections of the Texas Penal Code
must question if this is an appropriate punishment, as fitting within the goals of punish-
ment under the criminal justice system. For more information on Thompson, see supra
note 272 and corresponding text.
296. PEARSON, supra note 61, at 64.
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A. Our Response: A New Direction
Infanticide is not a rare and exceptional act committed by a deranged
or evil woman. If society is to have any hope of preventing deaths of
children at the hands of their mothers, we must change our tendency to
blame only the mothers, identify the myriad ways in which our society
tolerates and perpetuates infanticide, and work to change these biases.
We can easily prevent infanticides by observing an underlying pattern evi-
dent in almost all infanticide cases, usually involving a combination of a
mother's vulnerable mental health status and her lack of social sup-
port.29 7 By recognizing the unique circumstances surrounding infanticide
and instituting laws that prescribe a consistent treatment for those con-
victed and acquitted,2 98 we must distinguish postpartum homicides from
child abuse killings.
In the face of disparate sentences wholly dependent on the predilec-
tions of local prosecutors, judges, juries, 99 and the winds of politics, a
statute must be created to treat infanticide cases and postpartum psycho-
sis on the basis of an explicit justification and consider factors involving
individual blameworthiness on a case-by-case basis. Under the Texas
Mental Health Code's broad definition of "mental illness," conditions
such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and clinical depression are, like
postpartum psychosis, neurobiological in nature and treatable as a bio-
chemical disease3c As a mental illness, postpartum psychosis should,
like schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, be recognized as a mitigating fac-
tor during charge and sentencing. 0 1
Even a mother who has been acquitted by reason of insanity for acts
committed while suffering from postpartum psychosis must be required
to receive the necessary treatment. However, this has often proved to be
difficult for the State, which must argue a position contrary to its conten-
tion at the trial court. Due to the debilitating effects and severity of the
defendant's mental illness, the State will contend that the defendant is
297. See Attia et al., supra note 85, at 110.
298. See EWING, supra note 51, at 66 (noting that convictions frequently depend on
the sympathetic nature of the trier of fact and that evidence of actual psychosis must be
established before a postpartum psychosis defense can be considered legally viable);
MEYER ET AL.., supra note 74, at 174 (discussing the development of legal responses to
infanticide).
299. See MEYER ET AL., supra note 74, at 173-74 (noting the incoherent and arbitrary
nature of case law within infanticide jurisprudence).
300. See Brian D. Shannon, Diversion of Offenders with Mental Illness: Recent Legis-
lative Reforms-Texas Style, 20 MENTAL & PHYSiAsL DIsABILITY L RE. 431, 432 (1996).
301. Schizophrenia and bipolar disorder are recognized as mitigating factors in a vari-
ety of case law. See Commonwealth v. Rizzuto, 777 A.2d 1069,1088-89 (Pa. 2001) (holding
that defendant's schizophrenia, though insufficient to overturn the jury's verdict, is a miti-
gating factor so as to warrant a new penalty hearing).
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unable to control or modify her behavior so as to require civil commit-
ment.302 However, this argument contradicts the State's contention at
302. See id. Section 574.034, Order for Temporary Mental Health Services denotes:
(a) The judge may order a proposed patient to receive court-ordered temporary inpa-
tient mental health services only if the judge or jury finds, from clear and convinc-
ing evidence, that:
(1) the proposed patient is mentally ill; and
(2) as a result of that mental illness the proposed patient:
(A) is likely to cause serious harm to himself;
(B) is likely to cause serious harm to others; or
(C) is:
(i) suffering severe and abnormal mental, emotional, or physical
distress;
(ii) experiencing substantial mental or physical deterioration of the pro-
posed patient's ability to function independently, which is exhibited
by the proposed patient's inability, except for reasons of indigence,
to provide for the proposed patient's basic needs, including food,
clothing, health, or safety; and
(iii) unable to make a rational and informed decision as to whether or
not to submit to treatment.
(b) The judge may order a proposed patient to receive court-ordered temporary out-
patient mental health services only if:
(1) the judge finds that appropriate mental health services are available to the
patient; and
(2) the judge or jury finds, from clear and convincing evidence, that:
(A) the proposed patient is mentally ill;
(B) the nature of the mental illness is severe and persistent;
(C) as a result of the mental illness, the proposed patient will, if not treated,
continue to:
(i) suffer severe and abnormal mental, emotional, or physical distress;
and
(ii) experience deterioration of the ability to function independently to
the extent that the proposed patient will be unable to live safely in
the community without court-ordered outpatient mental health ser-
vices; and
(D) the proposed patient has an inability to participate in outpatient treat-
ment services effectively and voluntarily, demonstrated by:
(i) any of the proposed patient's actions occurring within the two-year
period which immediately precedes the hearing; or
(ii) specific characteristics of the proposed patient's clinical condition
that make impossible a rational and informed decision whether to
submit to voluntary outpatient treatment.
(c) If the judge or jury finds that the proposed patient meets the commitment criteria
prescribed by Subsection (a), the judge or jury must specify which criterion listed
in Subsection (a)(2) forms the basis for the decision.
(d) To be clear and convincing under Subsection (a), the evidence must include expert
testimony and, unless waived, evidence of a recent overt act or a continuing pat-
tern of behavior that tends to confirm:
(1) the likelihood of serious harm to the proposed patient or others; or
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the criminal trial that the defendant was able to form the requisite crimi-
nal intent in spite of her mental illness; thus a re-examination of the in-
sanity defense may require a correlation between the Texas Penal Code
and the Texas Mental Health Code.3"3
On May 26,2001, the Texas legislature enacted S.B. No. 553, creating a
task force to review the insanity defense and the methods and procedures
by which a criminal defendant's competency to stand trial are evalu-
ated.3 This may indicate a potential change in the use of the insanity
defense in Texas in 2003.
(2) the proposed patient's distress and the deterioration of the proposed patient's
ability to function.
(e) To be clear and convincing under Subdividision (b)(2), the evidence must include
expert testimony and, unless waived, evidence of a recent overt act or a continuing
pattern of behavior that tends to confirm:
(1) the proposed patient's distress;
(2) the deterioration of ability to function independently to the extent that the
proposed patient will be unable to live safely in the community;, and
(3) the proposed patient's inability to participate in outpatient treatment services
effectively and voluntarily.
(f) The proposed patient and the proposed patient's attorney, by a written document
filed with the court, may waive the right to cross-examine witnesses, and, if that
right is waived, the court may admit, as evidence, the certificates of medical exami-
nation for mental illness. The certificates admitted under this subsection consti-
tute competent medical or psychiatric testimony, and the court may make its
findings solely from the certificates. If the proposed patient and the proposed pa-
tient's attorney do not waive in writing the right to cross-examine witnesses, the
court shall proceed to hear testimony. The testimony must include competent
medical or psychiatric testimony. In addition, the court may consider the testi-
mony of a nonphysician mental health profession as provided by Section
574.031(f).
(g) An order for temporary inpatient or outpatient mental health services shall state
that treatment is authorized for not longer than 90 days. The order may not spec-
ify a shorter period.
(h) A judge may not issue an order for temporary inpatient or outpatient mental
health services for a proposed patient who is charged with a criminal offense that
involves an act, attempt, or threat of serious bodily injury to another person.
(i) A judge may advise, but may not compel, the proposed patient to:
(1) receive treatment with psychoactive medication as specified by the outpatient
mental health services treatment plan;
(2) participate in counseling; and
(3) refrain from the use of alcohol or illicit drugs.
Id.
303. See id.; diGenova & Toensing, supra note 150, at 732.
304. See S.B. 553, 2001 Leg., 77th Sess. (Tex. 2001). The enrolled version of S.B. 553
states:
AN ACT
Relating to the creation of a task force to review the methods and procedures used to
evaluate a criminal defendant's competency to stand trial and use of the insanity defense.
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BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF TEXAS:
SECTION 1.
(a) A task force is established to review the methods and procedures used to evaluate
a criminal defendant's competency to stand trial and the use of the insanity de-
fense and to submit a report to the 78th Legislature. The task force serves in an
advisory capacity.
(b) The task force is composed of 16 members as follows:
(1) a member of the senate appointed by the lieutenant governor.
(2) a member of the house of representatives appointed by the speaker of the
house or representatives;
(3) a district judge appointed by the presiding judge of the court of criminal
appeals;
(4) a representative of The University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston and
a representative of the Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center, each of
whom has experience in forensic science, appointed by the executive head of
the represented entity;
(5) a representative of a public or private school of law in this state with expertise
in forensic or mental health law, appointed by the lieutenant governor; and
(6) the executive head of each of the following agencies or associations or that
person's designated representative:
(A) the Texas Department of Criminal Justice;
(B) the Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation;
(C) the Texas Council on Offenders with Mental Impairments;
(D) the Texas District and County Attorneys Association;
(E) the Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association;
(F) the Texas Association of Counties;
(G) the Texas Medical Association;
(H) the Texas Society of Psychiatric Physicians;
(I) Capacity for Justice; and
(J) The Texas Psychological Association.
(c) Initial appointments to the task force must be made not later than December 31,
2001.
(d) The task force shall elect a presiding officer from its members at its first meeting.
The task force shall meet at least four times each year and may meet at other
times at the call of the presiding officer.
(e) The Texas Council on Offenders with Mental Impairments shall perform the ad-
ministrative functions of the task force.
(f) The task force is not subject to Chapter 2110, Government Code. A member of
the task force may not receive compensation but is entitled to reimbursement of
the travel expenses incurred by the member while conducting task force business,
as provided in the General Appropriations Act.
(g) In conducting its review of the methods and procedures used to evaluate a crimi-
nal defendant's competency to stand trial and use of the insanity defense, the task
force shall:
(1) examine the process by which the examination of a defendant is initiated and
administered, including the required and actual use of forms and other
documentation;
(2) review the manner in which a person is appointed to conduct an examination;
(3) evaluate the adequacy of the qualifications and training of persons who may
be appointed to conduct an examination;
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B. The "Guilty But Mentally Ill" Verdict
Intended as a plea or additional verdict rather than a replacement for
the insanity plea,3"' the "guilty but mentally ill" (GBMI) verdict was pre-
mised on the idea juries may decide that the defendant's mental illness,
after weighing the evidence, was not serious enough to justify an acquittal
but indicated a need for treatment?' 6 As an alternative to the stark "all-
or-nothing" scenario of either finding a mentally ill individual guilty of
the criinal offense or completely acquitting them of any criminal liabil-
ity,30 7 the GBMI verdict presents different penalty implications for de-
fendants whose mental health conditions do not rise to the level of legal
insanity? 08
Employed in cases invoking the insanity defense, the GBMI verdict
requires the defendant to be guilty of an offense and to have been men-
tally ill, but not legally insane, when he committed the charged offense?'°9
The court must determine whether the defendant is so severely mentally
disabled as to be in need of treatment according to the provisions of the
(4) consider alternative means to:
(A) increase cost effectiveness in the examination process; and
(B) maximize third-party payment of the cost of examinations; and
(C) assess the potential use and benefits of telepsychiatry.
(h) In addition to taking action under Subsection (g) of this section, the task force
may take other action it considers necessary or advisable to conduct an effective
review.
(i) The task force shall submit a report based on its findings to the legislature not later
than December 31, 2002. As part of its report, the task force shall submit to the
legislature specific recommendations for legislation.
(j) This Act expires and the task force established under this Act is abolished Febru-
ary 1, 2003.
SECTION 2.
This Act takes effect immediately if it receives a vote of two-thirds of all the members
elected to each house, as provided by Section 39, Article I1, Texas Constitution. If this
Act does not receive the vote necessary for immediate effect, this Act takes effect Septem-
ber 1, 2001.
Id.
305. See Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 74 (Nev. 2001).
306. See Whatley, supra note 151, at 9; Ira Mickenberg, A Pleasant Surprise: The
Guilty but Mentally Ill Verdict Has Both Succeeded in Its Own Right and Successfully Pre-
served the Traditional Role of the Insanity Defense, 55 U. CIN. L REv. 943, 949-50 (1987).
307. See Finger, 27 P.3d at 74 (noting juries may be less inclined to improperly acquit
defendants out of sympathy because they have a "middle-ground" option).
308. See id. (arguing that any sentence may be imposed on defendants who were con-
victed or pled to a guilty but mentally ill verdict, which can be lawfully imposed on any
defendant convicted of the same offense); Commonwealth v. Comitz, 530 A.2d 473, 477
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1987); Mickenberg, supra note 306, at 988.
309. See ScswARrz & IssaR, supra note 63, at 109.
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Mental Health Code at the time of sentencing. 10 Upon a verdict of
"guilty but mentally ill," the defendant is placed on probation conditional
upon receiving treatment.
311
However, a finding of mental illness sufficient to support a guilty plea
does not necessarily equate to a substantial ground which excuses the
defendant's conduct. 312 In fact, the trial court can reject the sentence of
probation to impose instead total confinement on defendants determined
to be mentally ill; thus, a plea of "guilty but mentally ill" does not neces-
sarily require a finding of probation in every case.313 Upon evaluation
during sentencing, a defendant found "guilty but mentally ill" may be
institutionalized at a treatment facility or mental hospital instead of
prison.314 Nevertheless, the defendant must serve out the remainder of
his sentence, even if he is released from the treatment facility before his
prison term expires.31 5 Conversely, if the prison sentence expires while
the defendant is still in the treatment facility, the defendant must then be
released or civilly committed.31 6
As of today, Texas has yet to adopt the GBMI verdict. Opponents con-
tend the GBMI verdict may confuse jurors or allow them to evade their
duties in cases involving insanity.317 Arguably, the GBMI, as a supple-
ment rather than replacement of the insanity defense,318 aids rather than
confuses jurors by giving them a more flexible range of verdicts by which
to conform the weight of the evidence to their decision.319 If the GBMI
verdict was used to provide psychiatric care to those found guilty but nev-
ertheless mentally ill, opponents argue Texas law already accomplishes
this result by providing for the transfer of any prisoner in the custody of




314. See Whatley, supra note 151, at 9.
315. See id. (determining a penal sentence would be imposed on the defendant if he
was found guilty, but such defendants usually receive psychiatric care instead); Barton,
supra note 180, at 600; Mickenberg, supra note 306, at 988.
316. See Whatley, supra note 151, at 9.
317. See id. at 10 (noting that, because the line between insanity and sanity is already
imprecise, forcing laymen to distinguish also between insanity and some lesser degree of
mental illness just compounds the problem); Farabee & Spearly, supra note 203, at 676
(arguing the guilty but mentally ill verdict unnecessarily complicates the trial process and
may mislead the public into believing that this verdict replaced the insanity defense).
318. See Mickenberg, supra note 306, at 992.
319. See Whatley, supra note 151, at 10 (clarifying the guilty but mentally ill verdict
allows jurors to indicate a need for mental health care without compromising their judg-
ment of the defendant's moral blameworthiness); Christopher Slobogin, The Guilty but




the Department of Corrections to a mental hospital if treatment is re-
quired.32  But article 46.01, section 2, the provision by which the State is
authorized to transfer prisoners in this manner under the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure, has been repealed by acts of the seventy-sixth legis-
lature in 1999. As a legal conviction,3 2 1 a GBMI verdict allows the defen-
dant to receive psychiatric care during his prison sentence if the jury finds
that the defendant suffers from a mental illness." 2 The State must still
prove all elements of the charged offense, including mens rea, while the
defendant bears the burden of proving the existence of a mental
iness.323
The purposes of the GBMI verdict calibrate closely with the treatment
and rehabilitation goals of postpartum psychosis. The defendant is sen-
tenced as if he had been found guilty but afforded medical and psychiat-
ric treatment while being confined in either a mental hospital or prison
for the entirety of his sentence3 24 Because the medical definition of in-
sanity does not necessarily correspond to its legal counterpart, postpar-
tum psychosis may not meet the requirements of legal insanity. Acts of
infanticide, even when committed while suffering from postpartum de-
pression, are punishable crimes which also warrant medical or psychiatric
treatment. Use of the GBMI verdict creates a uniformity of outcomes
and allows juries to make an unambiguous statement about the defen-
dant's guilt, mental condition, and moral responsibility, eliminating con-
flicts between legal and medical experts in the Battle of Experts.325
320. See Tax. CODE GRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.01(2) (Vernon 2001) (indicating that
prisoners are returned to the Texas Department of Corrections to serve the remainder of
their sentences upon completion of their treatment). Effective since September 1, 1999,
this section has been repealed by the seventy-sixth legislative session. I.
321. See Mickenberg, supra note 306, at 988 (reasoning that a finding of GBMI may
only be made after the jury decides to reject the insanity defense under the rationale that.
since the defendant was sufficiently in possession of his faculties to be morally blamewor-
thy for his act even though he was mentally ill, his act constitutes a criminal conviction that
is equivalent to a verdict of guilty).
322. See diGenova & Toensing, supra note 150, at 729-33 (noting that defendants
under this verdict are criminal defendants who have a degree of mental illness and should
be released only after they have both substantially served the sentence imposed for the
crime committed and are determined to be no longer dangerous, rather than being re-
leased either when their sentence is completed or they are no longer mentally ill); Mick-
enberg, supra note 306, at 950.
323. See diGenova & Toensing, supra note 150, at 732-33.
324. See Mickenberg, supra note 306, at 950-88.
325. See TEx. R. Evrm. 702,703 (noting that the Battle of the Experts is defined in the
commentary as occurring when both sides attempt to produce expert testimony for their
argument); Mickenberg, supra note 306, at 989. Rule 702, Opinions and Expert Testimony,
states: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge wvill assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an
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Unlike the justification defense, the GBMI verdict provides necessary
and acceptable mitigation in the form of psychiatric assistance while the
defendant serves his sentence, as opposed to reducing the degree of crime
for which the defendant is responsible. 326 Noting defendants convicted
under the GBMI verdict have been given the same treatment while serv-
ing their prison sentences as those found guilty and diagnosed with
mental illness, 327 opponents allege that GBMI is a useless verdict that
gives the mistaken impression to jurors that they are helping the mentally
ill by providing psychiatric care.328 While defendants convicted of the
GBMI verdict should theoretically receive medical treatment as part of
the intended purposes of GBMI, in practice, this goal has not been real-
ized.3 29 This inconsistency exists for purely financial reasons, however.3
The lack of state funding for treatment is the culprit rather than a flaw in
the GBMI verdict itself.331
C. Mitigation
Texas Penal Code section 8.05 states that a mitigating factor of duress
may apply to situations in which some type of external pressure is directly
exerted upon the defendant in an attempt to force commission of the
crime.332 Unlike defenses employing duress, coercion, threat, and com-
pulsion, some may argue postpartum psychosis deals with internal, psy-
opinion or otherwise." TEx. R. EVID. 702. Rule 703, Opinions and Expert Testimony,
observes:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by, reviewed by, or made known to the expert at or
before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular
field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be
admissible in evidence.
TEx. R. EVID. 703.
326. See Mickenberg, supra note 306, at 990.
327. See Whatley, supra note 151, at 10.
328. See Mickenberg, supra note 306, at 993.
329. See id.
330. See id. at 993-95.
331. See id. (stressing the fact that just because there is no funding does not mean that
a good idea should be abandoned, rather the question of funding must be resolved to make
the idea work).
332. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.05 (Vernon 2001) (noting the affirmative de-
fense is available where defendants are compelled by an imminent threat of serious bodily
injury or death to themselves or another); State v. Holden, 365 S.E.2d 626,629 (N.C. 1988)
(relating North Carolina's statutory mitigating factor of duress). Section 8.05, Duress,
denotes:
(a) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution that the actor engaged in the
proscribed conduct because he was compelled to do so by threat of imminent
death or serious bodily injury to himself or another.
[Vol. 4:339
POSTPARTUM PSYCHOSIS
chological forces which lead a mother to take the life of her child.
Arguably, even though the defendant's psychological conditions were
caused by external factors (i.e., stressful environment or lack of social
support), such external factors were not directed toward forcing the de-
fendant to commit the crime; thus, evidence of the defendant's mental
condition demonstrates the defendant performed the act under influence
of mental suffering rather than compulsion.3 33 However, this does not
account for the fact that external factors which cause the defendant's psy-
chological condition may have been one of the various biological and in-
ternal elements which exerted direct control over the defendant in the
form of postpartum psychosis, allowing partial mitigation to still be a via-
ble alternative.
Undoubtedly, neonaticide and infanticide, even in their most basic def-
initions, are crimes that should be punished as such, but defendants who
act while suffering from postpartum psychosis can also be seen as victims;
their actions are almost understandable as inevitable responses to a hos-
tile psychological environment.3 4 Such individuals become a potential
threat to society when no treatment or rehabilitation is made available to
prevent them from repeating their behavior in the future.
In seeking the most effective method by which the goals of punishment
can be achieved, we are faced with several options. Following the trend
spearheaded by Great Britain, we can alternatively choose to charge a
defendant who acted while suffering from postpartum psychosis with
manslaughter as opposed to murder. Moreover, we can combine a sen-
tence of imprisonment with mandatory psychiatric care. 35 Since incar-
ceration alone cannot help a defendant suffering from postpartum
psychosis modify her behavior or educate her so as to avoid future repeti-
tious behavior, the defendant can also be hospitalized in a psychiatric in-
(b) In a prosecution for an offense that does not constitute a felony, it is an
affirmative defense to prosecution that the actor engaged in the proscribed
conduct because he was compelled to do so by force or threat of force.
(c) Compulsion within the meaning of this section exists only if the force or threat of
force would render a person of reasonable firmness incapable of resisting the
pressure.
(d) The defense provided by this section is unavailable if the actor intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly placed himself in a situation in which it was probable
that he would be subjected to compulsion.
(e) It is no defense that a person acted at the command or persuasion of his spouse,
unless he. acted under compulsion that would establish a defense under this
section.
TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.05 (Vernon 2001).
333. See Holden, 365 S.E.2d at 629-30.
334. See ScHWaw rZ & ISSER, supra note 63, at 81.
335. See id. at 83.
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stitution or ordered to serve probation coupled with psychotherapy 3 6
However, such proposals may contradict the moral blamelessness argu-
ment provided by the insanity defense, where the defendant lacked the
essential element of criminal intent 337
D. Education
A bill proposed in the House of Representatives instituting the Me-
lanie Stokes338 Postpartum Depression Research and Care Act 339 is rep-
resentative of federal recognition of the problems caused by postpartum
psychosis. The Act aims to provide research and services for women suf-
fering from postpartum depression by expanding our current understand-
ing of postpartum conditions. In addition to providing funding for
research to develop and improve diagnostic techniques and treatments
for postpartum disorders, 4 ° the Act also creates informative programs to
educate healthcare professionals and the public alike about symptoms of
postpartum psychosis so as to avoid tragedies which are easily preventa-
ble.341 Moreover, a trend toward therapeutic jurisprudence distinguishes
infanticide from more "traditional" homicides and emphasizes the need
for different prosecutorial and punitive measures.3 42 Encouraging judges
to learn how other countries deal with neonaticide and infanticide, thera-
peutic jurisprudence questions the logic of incarcerating a defendant who
acted under a mental illness or cognitive dysfunction, focusing instead on
rehabilitation.343
336. See id. at 86 (stressing probation can possibly be served with a condition of com-
munity service to educate others).
337. See Lentz, supra note 64, at 543.
338. See 147 CONG. REc. E1278 (daily ed. June 29, 2001) (statement of Rep. Rush)
(noting the Melanie Stokes Postpartum Depression Research and Care Act was introduced
not only in memory of Melanie Stokes but also all women who suffered from postpartum
depression and psychosis). Melanie Stokes suffered from postpartum psychosis after giv-
ing birth to her daughter and consequently jumped from a twelve-story window to her
death on June 11, 2001. Id. This Act recognizes that more than 400,000 women suffer from
postpartum mood changes each year and approximately 80% of new mothers experience
"baby blues." Id.
339. See H.R. 2380, 107th Cong. (2001).
340. See id.
341. See id.
342. See SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 63, at 154-55.
343. See id. (providing the act of incarcerating mothers will not deter another from
committing infanticide under the rationale that, if one does not plan for an act to occur,
one cannot be deterred from such act, advocating instead incarceration in combination
with mandatory rehabilitative counseling or psychotherapy as a condition of probation,




"What a society perceives about violence has less to do with a fixed
reality than the lenses ve are given through which to see."'I
Patricia Pearson, twentieth-century writer
The widespread belief that "people are getting away with murder" and
the public outcry engendered by infanticide are producing an ugly anger
that inevitably undermines our compassion and erodes our understanding
of postpartum psychosis as a mental illness. Though our need to exact
retribution may be satisfied temporarily by punishing the mothers who
act while inflicted by postpartum psychosis, the morality and humanity of
society will suffer in the long run. Even though postpartum psychosis has
long been established as a mental illness medically recognized to cause
violent crimes, we have been hesitant to give it the same legal response
that we use for other mental conditions such as schizophrenia. This reluc-
tance has been in part because postpartum psychosis affects only one par-
ticular group of our society and forces us to examine our own prejudices
and biases formed about the social construct of motherhood.
Our punitive approach toward postpartum psychosis is ineffective and
fails to fulfill any of the goals of punishment within the criminal justice
system. Realizing that "understanding" is not the equivalent of "excus-
ing," we must strive instead to understand and treat postpartum psycho-
sis-induced conduct so as to prevent a reoccurrence of such behavior. It
is undisputed that a mother who kills her child while suffering from post-
partum psychosis has committed a crime, but the uneven treatment and
emphasis on punishment across the United States of mothers who com-
mit infanticide must be restructured, and the way that they "pay" for
their acts re-evaluated. Do we want to exact retribution from those who
did not know what they were doing was wrong? What will our public
need for retribution accomplish? Furthermore, can the mentally ill be
deterred by punishment and incarceration alone, without attempts at re-
habilitation and treatment for their mental illness?
Aristotle once noted, "[W]hat lies in our powers to do, lies in our pow-
ers not to do." 45 As Harris County prosecutors seek the death penalty in
the case of Andrea Yates in January 2002,11 we can no longer ignore the
consequences of postpartum psychosis-otherwise the tragedy has only
just begun.
344. PEARSON, supra note 61, at 6.
345. diGenova & Toensing, supra note 150, at 728.
346. See Bruce Nichols, Yates Trial Faces Long Jury Selection, DALLAs MORNINo
NEWS, Jan. 6, 2002, at 45A; David Williams, Postpartum Psydiosis: A Difficult Defense,




"It seems to me we are still back in the days of the Salem witch
trials. " 3 47
George Parnham, defense attorney for Yates
Andrea Yates pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity and was con-
victed of two counts of capital murder in the drownings of Noah, aged 7,
John, aged 5, and six-month-old daughter Mary on March 12, 2002.348
After three and a half hours of deliberation, the 8-women and 4-men jury
panel rejected the defense's argument that Yates was so mentally ill when
she drowned the children she was unaware her conduct was wrong.349
Although Harris County District Attorney Chuck Rosenthal had previ-
ously announced the State would seek execution, prosecutors failed to
directly ask the jury to recommend the death penalty and offered no wit-
nesses or evidence during the sentencing phase.350 In fact, prosecutors
347. Quotes of the Week, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Mar. 15, 2002, at 7E, available at
2002 WL 5329769.
348. See Carol Christian, Jury Gives Yates Life Term with No Parole for 40 Years,
HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 16, 2002, at 1, available at 2002 WL 3249582; Carol Christian,
Rosenthal Weighs More Charges in Yates Case, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 26, 2002, at
NEWS15, available at 2002 WL 3251910; Pam Easton, Family Pleads for Yates' Life at
Sentencing, MiLwAuKEE J. SENTINEL, Mar. 15,2002, at 3A, available at 2002 WL 3129814;
Pam Easton, Yates Avoids Facing the Executioner; She'll Do 40 Years Before Possibility of
Parole, SAN ANTONIO ExPRESs-NEws, Mar. 16, 2002, at 01A, available at 2002 WL
13907547; Pam Easton, Yates Is Formally Sentenced to Life, FORT WotT STAR-TELu.
GRAM, Mar. 19, 2002, available at 2002 WL 15685400; Insanity Laws Must Change, Child
Killer's Lawyer Says, DESERT NEws (Salt Lake City, Utah), Mar. 29,2002, at A06, availa-
ble at 2002 WL 16589765; Terri Langford & Anne Marie Kilday, For Yates, Life Behind
Bars: Jury Takes 35 Minutes to Decide that Mother Doesn't Deserve Death, DALLAS MORN-
ING NEWS, Mar. 16, 2002, at 1A, available at 2002 WL 15815913; Megan K. Stack, Yates
Gets Life Term for Killing Her Children; Prosecution Didn't Ask for Execution, SEAT=t
TIMES, Mar. 16, 2002, at 2A, available at 2002 WL 3893728.
349. See Christian, Jury Gives Yates Life Term with No Parole for 40 Years, supra note
348; Easton, Family Pleads for Yates' Life at Sentencing, supra note 348; Easton, Yates
Avoids Facing the Executioner; She'll Do 40 Years Before Possibility of Parole, supra note
348; Insanity Laws Must Change, Child Killer's Lawyer Says, supra note 348; Langford &
Kilday, supra note 348.
350. See Christian, Jury Gives Yates Life Term with No Parole for 40 Years, supra note
348 (observing that prosecutors clearly decided not to push aggressively for the death pen-
alty and claimed that they would accept whichever sentence the jurors chose); Easton,
Family Pleads for Yates' Life at Sentencing, supra note 348; Easton, Yates Avoids Facing the
Executioner; She'll Do 40 Years Before Possibility of Parole, supra note 348 (stating that
prosecutors denied making a less-than-passionate appeal for the death penalty in closing
arguments); Langford & Kilday, supra note 348 (stating prosecutors appeared to concede
that anything less than a death penalty decision was acceptable); Stack, supra note 348
(recognizing Assistant District Attorney Joseph Owmby later commented, "I didn't think
the facts in this case warranted asking the jury for the death penalty"). In closing argu-
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openly acknowledged during trial that Yates suffered from a severe
mental illness.35'
Because they felt Yates did not pose a future danger to society, the
same jury panel took only thirty-five minutes to return an automatic life
sentence, thereby sparing her life on March 15, 2002.35 Rosenthal has
since declared that charges will not be filed against Yates in the deaths of
her sons Paul, aged 3, and Luke, aged 2. Defense attorneys for Yates
intend to allege on appeal that prosecutors, by invoking the death pen-
alty, skewed the jury pool in favor of the State through pre-selection of
jurors less likely to accept an insanity defense.3 4 Because the prosecu-
tion never proved Yates posed any future danger, a requisite element in
seeking the death penalty, the defense argues that the prosecution sought
the death penalty solely to screen out sympathetic jurors? 55 Moreover,
ments, Prosecutor Owmby told jurors if they "want[ed] to sentence her [Yates] to life
rather than a death sentence, they will have done the right thing." Stack, supra note 348.
351. See Easton, Family Pleads for Yates' Life at Sentenchig, supra note 348; Langford
& Kilday, supra note 348. Noting Yates suffered from psychosis since 1999, psychiatric
witnesses for both the defense and prosecution agreed Yates was mentally ill, and, as a
result of her delusional thinking, she may have believed killing her children was the right
thing to do. See Langford & Kilday, supra note 348.
352. See Christian, Jury Gives Yates Life Term with No Parole for 40 Years, supra note
348; Christian, Rosenthal Weighs More Charges in Yates Case, supra note 348; Easton, Yates
Avoids Facing the Executioner; She'll Do 40 Years Before Possibility of Parole, supra note
348; Easton, Yates Is Formally Sentenced to Life, supra note 348 (noting Yates, as the sev-
entieth woman in Texas imprisoned for killing one or more of her children, is serving two
concurrent life terms and will be eligible for parole in 2041); Insanity Laws Must Change,
Child Killer's Lawyer Says, supra note 348; Langford & Kilday, supra note 348 (stating
Yates must serve 40 years of her sentence before she can become eligible for parole);
Stack, supra note 348 (observing Yates will be 77 years old before she is eligible for
parole).
353. See Langford & Kilday, supra note 348 (indicating the prosecution felt that evi-
dence issues appeared to improve their chances of a conviction if the children's deaths
were split up); Stack, sipra note 348.
354. See Alan Dershowitz, Yates Prosecutors Manipulated Jury Choice, NEVSDAY,
Mar. 20, 2002, at A35, available at 2002 WL 2734172 (contending the Harris County Dis-
trict Attorney's Office practically asked jurors not to return a death sentence as a wide-
spread tactic to manipulate the criminal justice system). If Yates had received the death
penalty, the merits of her entire case, including her conviction, would be viewed under
stricter scrutiny by appellate courts, aside from inviting more controversy and criticism.
See id. Prosecutors can challenge for cause any juror who would be unwilling to impose
the death sentence and thus ensure that they have a skewed jury consisting almost exclu-
sively of people who favor the death penalty and who tend to be more pro-prosecution.
See id.; see also TJ. Milling, Attorneys Make Case for Appeal by Yates, HousToN CuRoN.,
Mar. 29, 2002, at NEWS33, available at 2002 WL 3252767.
355. See Dershowitz, supra note 354; Milling, supra note 354. The prosecution coun-
ters by noting Yates' crime was heinous enough to serve as proof of the future threat she
posed to society. See Milling, supra note 354.
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the defense contends that Yates believed she was doing the right thing
despite her knowledge that her act was illegal.356
Like the many occasions when she alone had to care for her brood of
small children while confronting her own emotional and mental instabil-
ity, Yates was alone once again at her formal sentencing on March 18,
2002; her husband and relatives were making television appearances. 357
Attributing responsibility to doctors for misdiagnosing his wife's illness
and taking her off her medication, Russell Yates blamed Texas law for
defining insanity too narrowly and the public for not understanding
mental illness. 358 Yet how much of his family's current circumstances can
be attributed to him?35 9 Why did Russell Yates not insist that they stop
having more children when confronted with the doctor's warnings and his
wife's obviously fragile mental and emotional state, as evidenced by her
previous bouts with mental illness and suicide attempts? 360 Despite his
recognition of these factors, why did he not work to alleviate some of the
pressure on Andrea Yates? 361
While Yates' brother and mother accused Russell Yates o being a neg-
lectful husband oblivious to the signs that Yates could no longer handle
the overwhelming stress of her everday life, how fervently did they chal-
lenge Russell Yates on Andrea's behalf?362 How much assistance did
they offer despite their claims that they tried to intervene?3 63 Not only
did the inflexible insanity standard under Texas law fail to address her
356. See Dershowitz, supra note 354; Milling, supra note 354 (criticizing also Dietz's
use of evidence from a prior competency hearing in the trial as a violation of state law).
The defense specifically attacks the false testimony of the prosecution's expert psychiatric
witness, Dr. Park Dietz; Dietz testified Yates may have gotten the idea for her crime from
a television show about a woman who drowned her children and was acquitted by reason
of insanity, even though it was later discovered that this show never existed. See Milling,
supra note 354.
357. See Easton, Yates Is Formally Sentenced to Life, supra note 348 (noting Yates'
brother was on ABC's Good Morning America and her husband Rusell Yates was featured
on NBC's Today Show); Sheryl McCarthy, Yates Husband Had a Hand in this Tragedy,
REcoRD (Bergen County, N.J.), Mar. 22, 2002, at L11, available at 2002 WL 4651019.
358. See Easton, Yates Is Formally Sentenced to Life, supra note 348; Sally Kalson, His
Children's Graves Tell a Different Story, PrrrsaURGH POST-GAZErrE, Mar. 27, 2002, at BI,
available at 2002 WL 3805413; McCarthy, supra note 357.
359. See Easton, Yates Is Formally Sentenced to Life, supra note 348; Kalson, supra
note 358; McCarthy, supra note 357.
360. See Easton, Yates Is Formally Sentenced to Life, supra note 348; Kalson, supra
note 358; McCarthy, supra note 357.
361. See Easton, Yates Is Formally Sentenced to Life, supra note 348: Kalson, supra
note 358; McCarthy, supra note 357.
362. See Easton, Yates Is Formally Sentenced to Life, supra note 348; Kalson, supra
note 358; McCarthy, supra note 357.
363. See Easton, Yates Is Formally Sentenced to Life, supra note 348; Kalson, supra
note 358; McCarthy, supra note 357.
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case, Andrea Yates' conviction was most notably tragic in the sense that
the people closest to Yates watched her slowly deteriorate both emotion-
ally and mentally, heading into an eventual collapse, and still did nothing
to stop such an easily preventable tragedy?' 4
In addition to raising public awareness of postpartum psychosis and
postpartum mood disorders, the Yates case serves as a vehicle to examine
some of the oldest and most controversial topics in legal discourse.3 5
Analyzing issues from whether to hold mentally ill people responsible for
criminal acts3 6 6 to exposing the unethical, and perhaps unconstitutional,
prosecutorial practice of invoking the death penalty to skew the jury in its
favor,367 this case also elicits national discussion and criticism of topics
such as medical insurance coverage and prevailing gender roles today.?"58
364. See Easton, Yates Is Formally Sentenced to Life, supra note 348; Kalson, supra
note 358; McCarthy, supra note 357. Rosenthal recently stated that he had assigned a
member of his staff to look into the possibility of more charges, such as child endanger-
ment or negligent homicide, in the Yates case. See Christian, Rosenthal Weighs More
Charges in Yates Case, supra note 348. Noting that Texas law permits prosecution for
crimes of commission as well as omission, Rosenthal contends that anyone guilty of con-
tributing to the children's deaths will be prosecuted. See id. In response, Russell Yates'
attorney emphasized that his client is the epitome of a "victim" as defined by the penal
code and does not believe him to have committed any wrongdoing. See id. The Yates case
and other examples of mothers who have committed infanticide while suffering from post-
partum psychosis are all interlinked by a general pattern of recognizable symptoms, which
would have been relatively easy to diagnose and treat had those around them intervened.
365. See Insanity Laws Must Change, Child Killer's Lawyer Says, supra note 348; Mike
Tolson & Todd Ackerman, Jury Gives Yates Life Tern with No Parole for 40 Years / A
Catalyst for Change in Law on Insanity?, HousToN CHRos., Mar. 16, 2002, at NEWS1,
available at 2002 WL 3249596.
366. See Tolson & Ackerman, supra note 365 (noting Texas Representative Garnet
Coleman intends to introduce a bill in the upcoming legislative session to refine the in-
sanity defense statute). Since the national movement to eliminate the insanity defense,
following John Hinckley, Jr.'s acquittal of the attempted assassination of President Ronald
Reagan in 1981, the modem insanity statute differs little from those that existed before the
advent of psychiatry and neuroscience. See Insanity Laws Must Change, Child Killer's
Lawyer Says, supra note 348; Milling, supra note 354; Tolson & Ackerman, supra note 365.
National debate spurred by the Yates' trial gave rise to Pennsylvania's Senate Bill 26,
which seeks to exempt inmates with specific signs of chronic mental illness from the death
penalty under similar statutes pertaining to the mentally retarded. See Our View: Death
Row and the Mentally Ill, CEmTRE DAILY TIMES (State College, Pa.), Mar. 21,2002, at 8A,
available at 2002 WL 4547753; Tolson & Ackerman, supra note 365.
367. See Dershowitz, supra note 354 (observing courts generally refuse to look behind
the prosecutors' claim that they are seeking the death penalty in good faith); Milling, supra
note 354. This unfair practice serves to distort the fact-finding function of the jury. See
Dershowitz, supra note 354.
368. See Christian, Jury Gives Yates Life Termi with No Parole for 40 Years, supra note
348; Insanity Laws Must Change, Child Killer's Lawyer Says, supra note 348 (noting a
legislative change must be brought about because "the way the law has been applied has
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The Yates case is a catalyst which demands more than a mere re-examina-
tion of the insanity standard under Texas law; it requires an evaluation of
influences within our society as a whole.
nothing to do with the science and what we know about mental illness"); Langford &
Kilday, supra note 348; McCarthy, supra note 357.
[Vol. 4:339
